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Articles
THE AMERICAN NEGLIGENCE RULE
Mark F. Grady*
Abstract
This Article reviews and proposes a revision of the orthodox academic view
of the negligence breach of duty requirement. The orthodox view comes from
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s treatment in his book, The Common Law, and stresses
the defendant’s conduct. According to Holmes, negligence is conduct “on the
wrong side of the line.” Hence, negligence is the failure to have a spark arrester
on one’s locomotive, the failure to check one’s blind spot before changing lanes,
and the failure to retrieve all sponges before closing a patient. Legal economists
have built on this view. They have argued that negligent conduct is that which
fails the Learned Hand formula, in other words, conduct that lacks cost-beneficial
precautions. Legal economists have also posited that juries as well as judges use
cost-benefit analysis to assess negligent conduct. Legal philosophers, although
they often reject cost-benefit analysis, also adhere to Holmes’s conduct theory of
breach of duty. Nevertheless, a close analysis of modern negligence cases reveals
that American juries are often allowed and even encouraged to forgive negligent
conduct. They routinely forgive failures to check blind spots, failures to retrieve
all sponges from patients, failures of pharmacists to dispense the correct drugs,
and the like. In the present century, this practice of jury forgiveness, and courts’
acceptance of it, seems to be becoming more common. This Article explores the
true legal structure of breach of duty and how it diverges from Holmes’s conduct
theory and the orthodox academic view of negligence, which is still based on
Holmes’s conduct theory.
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I. INTRODUCTION

During this century, it has become increasingly evident that modern
negligence practice can no longer fit comfortably within traditional
academic theories.1 During the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, scholars vigorously debated whether civil negligence was
essentially a state of mind or conduct. The greatest American legal scholar
of that era, Oliver Wendell Holmes, became the champion of the conduct
theory, and in academic circles his ideas won out. Holmes was an
American pragmatist, and his conduct theory of negligence was a victory
for the pragmatist idea that the social world must be judged by objective
data, not by interior mental processes.2 Nevertheless, Holmes certainly
did not pull the conduct theory of negligence exclusively from his
pragmatist ideals. As he demonstrated in his scholarly work, conduct
1
See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1187, 1187–
24 (2001).
2
Holmes wrote:
[I]t must be borne in mind that law only works within the sphere of the
senses. If the external phenomena, the manifest acts and omissions, are
such as it requires, it is wholly indifferent to the internal phenomena of
conscience. A man may have as bad a heart as he chooses, if his conduct
is within the rules. In other words, the standards of the law are external
standards, and, however much it may take moral considerations into
account, it does so only for the purpose of drawing a line between such
bodily motions and rests as it permits, and such as it does not. What the
law really forbids, and the only thing it forbids, is the act on the wrong
side of the line, be that act blameworthy or otherwise.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 110 (1881) [hereinafter HOLMES, COMMON
LAW].
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conceptions of negligence and its precursors go back to the Year Books. 3
As we will see, however, the question is not whether the conduct theory
of negligence possesses some validity; it certainly is a useful explanation
for many case results. The problem is that the conduct theory does not
account for all negligence case results; many are plainly inconsistent with
it.
The focus of this Article will be on courts’ increasing willingness to
allow juries “to forgive” objectively defined negligence. This is mainly an
American story for the simple reason that most common-law jurisdictions
no longer try negligence cases to juries. Still, as we will see, in U.S. courts,
encouragement of jury forgiveness has become more pronounced as the
years have passed. Throughout much of the twentieth century, if a jury
did forgive a defendant’s objective negligence, the trial judge, acting
within a broad discretion, would usually order a new trial for the plaintiff.
This order would usually prompt a settlement for less than full damages.
Increasingly, trial courts are less likely to order a new trial for plaintiffs
whose defendants have been forgiven. They let the jury’s forgiveness stick
and even order the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s litigation costs. 4 Some
prior commentators have noticed this development and call these cases
instances of “jury nullification,” following terminology originally used in
the criminal setting.5 This terminology seems to suggest that courts or
other authorities oppose jury forgiveness and think of it as anti-social.
Instead, the courts fully accept jury forgiveness as a fundamental part of
the orthodox negligence rule. Indeed, the practice dates from the birth of
accident law in the Middle Ages.
II. HOLMES’S CONDUCT THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE
At the turn of the twentieth century the leading problem in tort law
was whether civil negligence was conduct or a state of mind. In 1881,
Oliver Wendell Holmes initiated this debate by forcefully claiming that
negligence was exclusively conduct, namely, conduct that fell below due
care. He wrote that a man could have “as bad a heart as he chooses” but
would still avoid liability so long as he stays on the right side of the

HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 107. Holmes is quoting Judge Rede: “In
trespass the intent” (we may say more broadly, the defendant’s state of mind) “cannot be
construed.” The parenthetical interpolation is Holmes’s.
4
See, e.g., Minnegren v. Nozar, 4 Cal. App. 5th 500, 514 (Ct. App. 2016) (ordering plaintiff
to pay defendant’s court costs in case in which defendant failed to yield right-of-way and tboned plaintiff); discussion infra text accompanying note 171.
5
See, e.g., Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1603 (2001).
3
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conduct line.6 This idea was soon embraced by powerful allies, notably
James Barr Ames,7 Henry T. Terry,8 and Henry W. Edgerton.9 This
position became the orthodoxy of the twentieth century and the
foundation of its leading scholarly theories. 10
Holmes’s conduct theory came early in the history of the modern
negligence rule. The case of Vaughan v. Menlove,11 from 1837, has a good
claim to be considered the first case decided on a negligence theory. 12 The
defendant had constructed his hayrick in a way that made spontaneous
6

2.

HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 110. For the full quotation, see supra note

7
See James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 99 (1908) (stating in
negligence law "[t]he ethical standard reasonable conduct has replaced the unmoral standard
of acting at one's peril"). Ames opened his article with a quotation from an early English
chief justice: “The thought of man shall not be tried, for the devil himself knoweth not the
thought of man.” Id. at 97.
8
See Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1915) ("Negligence is conduct,
not a state of mind.").
9
See Henry W. Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence, and Indifference: The Relation of Mental
States to Negligence, 39 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1925). He wrote:
Negligence neither is nor involves (“presupposes”) either indifference,
or inadvertence, or any other mental characteristic, quality, state, or
process. Negligence is unreasonably dangerous conduct—i.e., conduct
abnormally likely to cause harm. Freedom from negligence (commonly
called “due care”) does not require care, or any other mental
phenomenon, but requires only that one’s conduct be reasonably safe—
as little likely to cause harm as the conduct of a normal person would
be.
Id. at 852.
10
See Patrick J. Kelley, A Critical Analysis of Holmes's Theory of Torts, 61 WASH. U. L. Q. 681,
740 (1983) (assessing Holmes’s influence on tort theory); Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts,
54 VAND. L. REV. 1225 (2001) (same). See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 29, 38 (1972) [hereinafter Posner, Theory of Negligence] (defining negligence as
substandard conduct as revealed by the Learned Hand formula). According to Posner, juries
also apply the Learned Hand formula and assess whether conduct was substandard. Id. at
51–52.
11
See Vaughan v. Menlove (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492; 7 Car. & P. 525 (leaving it to the
jury to determine if defendant acted as a prudent man).
12
Another contender for the “first negligence case” is Christie v. Griggs (1809) 170 Eng.
Rep. 1088; 2 Camp. 79, which was brought by a passenger aboard the defendant’s stagecoach
that crashed because of a broken axle. Id. at 1088–89. In this case, however, the parties had
entered a contract for common carriage, and the plaintiff brought his suit not as “negligence”
but as “assumpsit,” reflecting either the contract itself or the “undertaking” by the defendant
to carry the plaintiff to his destination. Id. Christie v. Griggs is now regarded as a negligence
case in which the defendant’s duty of care arose from the special relationship of common
carrier-passenger or from the defendant’s “undertaking,” but it was not brought on a
negligence theory. On the other hand, the case report for Vaughan v. Menlove did stress that
it had been brought on a “negligence” theory and also that it was a case “of the first
impression.” Vaughan, 132 Eng. Rep. at 492. The modern negligence cases are commonly
understood to have evolved from older cases brought under the writs of trespass vi et armis
and trespass on the case.
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combustion a risk. His neighbor, the plaintiff, warned him several times
that the hayrick was dangerous, but the defendant answered that “he
would chance it” and, even more maddeningly, that his property “was
insured.”13 When the predictable occurred and the resulting fire burned
down the plaintiff’s cottages, he sued for negligence. The jury was
instructed that “the question for them to consider, was, whether the fire
had been occasioned by gross negligence on the part of the [d]efendant;
adding, that [the defendant] was bound to proceed with such reasonable
caution as a prudent man would have exercised under such
circumstances.”14 After the jury had found for the plaintiff, the defendant
attacked the verdict on the ground that “he ought not to be responsible for
the misfortune of not possessing the highest order of intelligence” and that
the jury should have been asked simply whether the defendant had acted
“bona fide to the best of his judgment.” 15 The appellate court held that the
jury had indeed been properly instructed and that the defendant’s
proposed conception of the negligence rule (mere good faith in using
precaution) would be too subjective. 16
Thus, the Vaughan v. Menlove court accepted an objective conception
of negligence, but it was an objective definition of a negligent state of mind
that seemingly defined the tort under the Vaughan court’s discussion.
This was not the end of the matter, however, because Vaughan v.
Menlove was soon followed by Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. 17 That
case involved a municipal fire hydrant system that failed during a period
of exceptionally cold weather and flooded the plaintiff’s house. The
plaintiff’s case at trial was that the defendant had noticed that ice had
encrusted the hydrant plugs that needed to pop out to relieve the stress of
expanding frozen water below.18 The system was so new and the weather
so extreme that the defendant had failed to realize before the accident that
the plugs needed to be cleaned in cold weather. The appellate court set
aside the jury’s verdict for the plaintiff and entered judgment as a matter
of law for the defendant.19 During this judgment, Baron Alderson gave
the following definition: “Negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.” 20 This
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

See Vaughan, 132 Eng. Rep. at 491.
Id. at 492.
Id.
Id. at 494.
See Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 1047; 11 Exch. 78.
Id. at 1048.
Id.
Id. at 1049.
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was also an objective test of negligence, but here the focus was on
reasonable conduct, not on a reasonable state of mind as in Vaughan v.
Menlove. Alderson and his colleagues found that the defendant had not
been negligent because its conduct had been reasonable given the lack of
experience with how this type of water system would perform under
frigid conditions.21 The accident was “unforeseeable.” This seminal case
was early in a cascade of similar cases limiting juries’ powers to find for
plaintiffs based on omitted precautions that could not be justified on costbenefit grounds.22
In the early scholarly debates about the definition of negligence, these
two early cases—Vaughan and Blyth—became contested beacons, each
suggesting an objective standard of negligence but one focusing on the
reasonableness of the defendant’s state of mind and the other on the
reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct. 23
In 1861, writing five years after Blyth and twenty years before Holmes,
the English legal theorist John Austin claimed that negligence was
essentially a faulty state of mind. 24 In developing his theory, Austin chose
as his principal example a “nondurable precaution,” that is, precaution
that does not last long and typically must be used repetitively. 25 We will
see that conduct theorists, such as Holmes and his modern academic
followers like Richard Posner, tend to focus on “durable” precautions,
such as worn-out metal “nosing” on the edges of wooden steps and
missing “safety appliances” on trains.26 Austin’s featured untaken
precaution was the failure of a shooter to advert to the possibility that his
bullet might pass through his target on his garden fence to a public road
beyond.27 Austin’s detailed theory entailed an examination of the various
See id. (finding that defendant’s lack of experience with the risk in question resulted in
unforeseeability).
22
See infra text accompanying note 96.
23
Compare Vaughan v. Menlove (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493; 7 Car. & P. 525 (focusing
on state of mind), with Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049;
11 Exch. 780 (focusing on conduct).
24
See JOHN AUSTIN, Lecture XX: Negligence, Heedlessness, and Rashness, in LECTURES ON
JURISPRUDENCE 425–34 (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1911) [hereinafter AUSTIN, LECTURES].
25
Id. at 427.
26
See, e.g., HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 110. See also Posner, Theory of
Negligence, supra note 10, at 38.
27
Austin’s main example of negligence was:
When I fire at the mark chalked upon the fence, it occurs to my mind
that a shot may pierce the fence, and may chance to hit a passenger. But
without examining carefully the ground of my conclusion, I conclude
that the fence is sufficiently thick to prevent a shot from passing to the
road. Or, without giving myself the trouble to look into the road, I
assume that a passenger is not there, because the road is seldom passed.
In either case, my confidence is rash; and, through my rashness or
21
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mental states that would qualify to demonstrate negligence. These
included “heedlessness,” “rashness,” “temerity,” “foolhardiness,” and
“inadvertence.”28
When Holmes wrote twenty years later, he used Austin’s theory as a
29
foil, arguing that Austin’s theories were inapposite to tort because
Austin was a criminalist and a moralist. 30 Holmes boldly asserted that
negligence liability could depend either on conduct or on the actor’s
“blameworthiness.”31 In his view, no third alternative existed and neither
did any middle ground.
In favor of his conduct theory, Holmes offered both doctrinal and
policy arguments. As to legal doctrine, Holmes argued that the writ of
trespass, from which negligence sprung, always depended on conduct. 32
He gave many examples from the doctrine of trespass to land or “trespass
quare clausum fregit,” as it was known in his day. 33 The important thing
was whether the defendant’s conduct was on the “right side” of the
property line. He argued that the theory of being on the “right side” of
the line extended to negligence, sometimes literally, as under rules of
traffic and navigation, originally imported from England. 34
From a policy point of view, there are three main reasons for
preferring a conduct standard to a standard that depends on a defendant’s
state of mind. The first reason is that when the negligence standard is
based on conduct, strangers can coordinate their precaution with each
other. Holmes seems to suggest this as a reason for a conduct standard
and then backs off.35
The second reason is that a conduct standard is easier for a tribunal to
measure than the defendant’s state of mind. Tort liability based on
blameworthiness inevitably depends on assessing the actor’s mental
processes, whereas conduct does not. Therefore, conduct is more
temerity, I am the author of the mischief. My assumption is founded
upon evidence which the event shews to be worthless, and of which I
should discover the worthlessness if I scrutinised it as I ought.
AUSTIN, LECTURES, supra note 24, at 428.
28
Id. at 427–28.
29
See HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 81–82.
30
See id. at 81–83.
31
Id. at 125–26.
32
See id. at 78, 80–81.
33
See id. at 83 (arguing that the writ of trespass was dependent on the actor’s conduct,
regardless of the actor’s intent).
34
Id. at 113–14.
35
Holmes wrote: “When a man has a distinct defect of such a nature that all can recognize
it as making certain precautions impossible, he will not be held answerable for not taking
them.” Id. at 109. Holmes’s stress of “distinct defects that all can recognize” logically leads
to the idea that these challenges can be the basis of coordination between injurer and victim,
but he does not stress this idea. Id.
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knowable than blameworthiness. Holmes stresses this reason and argues
that interior states of mind are inherently unknowable. 36
The third reason, which Holmes fully embraces and articulates with
several examples, is that a conduct standard lends itself to the
development of precedent that will clarify rules of conduct. 37
To see Holmes’s thinking, we can use the same case example that he
chose as an illustration. That was Crafter v. Metropolitan Railway,38 which
involved an ordinary slip and fall allegedly due to the defendant’s fault.
On July 28, 1864, soon after the construction of London’s first
underground railway, the plaintiff, while exiting his train at King’s Cross
Station, walked up the defendant’s exit steps. He slipped and fell, injuring
himself badly. The stairway in question was six feet wide and had a wall
on each side. The plaintiff was familiar with the stairway; he had used it
every work day for almost eighteen months, which would have been
practically from its first construction. Nevertheless, the plaintiff alleged
that this stairway was unreasonably unsafe, and his attorney proposed
three untaken precautions supported by two witnesses, at least one of
them an expert. First, the brass nosing on the edge of the stairs, although
originally roughened by the contractor, was worn slick. This was
unsurprising because the evidence also indicated that every month 43,000
passengers used this stairway. The second untaken precaution was the
lack of handrails. The third untaken precaution was that the nosing
should have been made of lead and not of brass because lead would have
stayed rough, presumably because constant traffic would have scarred
this softer metal.39 The defendant submitted no evidence but instead
rested mute, a dangerous trial strategy today but apparently common at
the time.
The trial court instructed the jurors that the question for them was
“whether or not the staircase afforded reasonable accommodation to the
public.”40 In its verdict, the jury found for the plaintiff that the staircase
was “unreasonable” and awarded him £105.41
The unanimous appellate court held that the evidence was insufficient
to support the verdict and entered final judgment for the defendant,
ordering that the plaintiff take nothing from his action. 42
See id. at 107–09.
Id. at 111–13, 120–29.
38
Crafter v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. (1866) 1 LRCP 300 (Eng.). Holmes mistakenly called the
case “Crafton [sic] v. Metropolitan Railway Co.” in his discussion. See HOLMES, COMMON
LAW, supra note 2, at 120.
39
See Crafter, 1 LRCP at 300–01.
40
Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
41
Id.
42
Id. at 301–04.
36
37
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Before we get into deeper issues, we can note the reasons the court
gave for its decision. It first stressed that the plaintiff was familiar with
these steps and the danger that caused him to trip.43 Second, the court
said that handrails would not have done much good because, when trains
unloaded, this staircase was so crowded that pedestrians could not always
reach a handrail.44 Third, the court noted that brass nosing was customary
on similar stairways.45 Justice Willes, who wrote the most influential
opinion, said: “We all know that brass is a material which is commonly
used for the nosing of stairs in public offices, steam-boats on the river, and
other places of much resort.”46
The bigger question for Holmes was how to understand this decision
and similar decisions as consistent with the rule of law. What was the
precise relationship between the judge’s realm and the jury’s in this case
and all such cases?
He started by noting that even back in his day lawyers said that
negligence presented a “mixed question of law and fact.” 47 If that is so,
Holmes reasoned, the breach of duty question can be broken down into
two separate questions: (1) what exactly did the defendant do or omit to
do; and (2) did the defendant’s conduct meet the legal standard? 48 The
difficulty was that the facts were so clear that the question given to the
Crafter jury seemed to concern only the second question; under clear and
undisputed facts the jury had been asked only whether the defendant’s
conduct was “reasonable.” This seems to be a legal and not a factual
question. Still, Holmes thought it would be reasonable for the court to
hear the jury’s answer:
When a case arises in which the standard of conduct, pure
and simple, is submitted to the jury, the explanation is
plain. It is that the court, not entertaining any clear views
of public policy applicable to the matter, derives the rule
to be applied from daily experience, as it has been agreed
that the great body of the law of tort has been derived.
But the court further feels that it is not itself possessed of
sufficient practical experience to lay down the rule
intelligently. It conceives that twelve men taken from the
practical part of the community can aid its judgment.

43
44
45
46
47
48

Id. at 301, 303, 305.
Crafter v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. (1866) 1 LRCP 300, 302–05 (Eng.).
Id.
Id. at 303.
See HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 122.
Id.
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Therefore it aids its conscience by taking the opinion of
the jury.49
The worry was, however, that different juries might answer the
question of negligence differently in future stairway cases and other cases
that were basically the same. In short, can we tolerate a situation of
“justice luck” where one owner is liable and another immune with
basically the same stairway? Holmes recoiled against this possibility and
invented a solution. He said that a trial judge with experience would see
how juries were answering the negligence question in common types of
cases, and once the general answer was clear, could order liability as a
matter of law or no liability as a matter of law in different types of cases.
These decisions would become legal precedents and could be refined as
time passed and even altered as technology progressed. Indeed, if courts
did not engage in this legal pruning, Holmes worried that they “would
leave all our rights and duties throughout a great part of the law to the
necessarily more or less accidental feelings of a jury.” 50
Holmes argued that these precedential rules of precaution would still
be limited by the doctrine of excuses and justifications, 51 but these would
also be objectively defined. Thus, a person with “pronounced” mental
illness52 might be excused for being on the wrong side of the line, as might
someone seeking to avoid a dangerous obstacle on the right side of the
line.
Thus, Holmes thought that negligence law could retain its law-like
quality and prevent the “accidental feelings of a jury” from holding sway
only if negligence litigation were governed by two principles. First, jury
instructions should become increasingly refined and detailed as the law
of precaution develops. Juries might be instructed that particular
precautions were required under particular conditions and would be left
to determine whether the triggering conditions were or were not present
at the time the accident in question occurred and whether the required
precaution was used. Second, judges would have the power in clear cases
to prevent or reject a jury verdict and order judgment as a matter of law.
Holmes thought these judgments would be symmetrically distributed
with judgments of breach of duty as a matter of law as common as the
opposite.53 Neither of these recommendations has been followed by the
courts, and we will consider them in order.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 126.
51
Id. at 113.
52
Id. at 109.
53
Holmes presciently used the example of a railroad grade crossing to illustrate his
reasoning:
49
50
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A. The Continued Generality of Negligence Jury Instructions
Most legal analysts see a division of labor between the judge and the
jury that does not exist in negligence cases. Supposedly, the judge is the
law explainer, and the jury is the law applier. Again, Holmes expressed
the usual view. He said that when the issue in a negligence case is whether
a party’s conduct came up to the legal standard of care—not so much what
the defendant’s conduct actually was—that the judge could explain this
legal standard to the jury in detail:
If there is such a dispute, it is entirely possible to give a
series of hypothetical instructions adapted to every state
of facts which it is open to the jury to find. 54
Moreover, as a trial judge becomes experienced with accident
situations like the case at bar, the judge can issue directed verdicts in more
and more cases. Even in those cases in which the judge wants the views
of laypeople from the community as an “aid [to the judge’s] conscience,”
with more experience he or she can do even better at explaining what the
detailed breach of duty standard is.55
If the whole evidence in the case was that a party, in full command of
his senses and intellect, stood on a railway track, looking at an
approaching engine until it ran him down, no judge would leave it to
the jury to say whether the conduct was prudent. If the whole evidence
was that he attempted to cross a level track, which was visible for half a
mile each way, and on which no engine was in sight, no court would
allow a jury to find negligence. Between these extremes are cases which
would go to the jury. But it is obvious that the limit of safety in such
cases, supposing no further elements present, could be determined
almost to a foot by mathematical calculation.
Id. at 128–29. The example was prescient because later, when he was a Supreme Court
Justice, Holmes sought to implement his thinking by making someone struck by a train
contributorily negligent as a matter of law. See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S.
66, 69 (1927) (holding plaintiff contributorily negligent for not getting out of his car to check
whether railroad tracks were clear). The case was ceremoniously limited by a later court.
See Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 103 (1934) (finding, under circumstances somewhat
different from those in Goodman, plaintiff did not need to get out of the car to look down the
tracks).
54
Id. at 122.
55
Holmes wrote:
If, now, the ordinary liabilities in tort arise from failure to comply with
fixed and uniform standards of external conduct, which every man is
presumed and required to know, it is obvious that it ought to be
possible, sooner or later, to formulate these standards at least to some
extent, and that to do so must at last be the business of the court. It is
equally clear that the featureless generality, that the defendant was
bound to use such care as a prudent man would do under the
circumstances, ought to be continually giving place to the specific one,
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The actual law of negligence has developed in the opposite direction
from Holmes’s views. The most common negligence instruction is the
reasonable person test, quite similar to Baron Alderson’s definition of
negligence in the 1856 case of Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co.,
discussed above.56 Many similar versions exist; the following is the New
York version, which retains the “featureless generality” 57 that Holmes
deplored:
Negligence is lack of ordinary care. It is a failure to use
that degree of care that a reasonably prudent person
would have used under the same circumstances.
Negligence may arise from doing an act that a reasonably
prudent person would not have done under the same
circumstances, or, on the other hand, from failing to do an
act that a reasonably prudent person would have done
under the same circumstances.58
This “reasonably prudent person” test will be called the “objective
standard” because it frames the negligence issue, as Holmes did, in terms
of conduct, not thought processes (the contrary position of Austin). It is
not widely realized, however, that this most common jury instruction
poses a metaphysical question in the most usual type of case to which it
applies, a common and obvious error in failing to use some reasonable
precaution, such as on one occasion failing to check a supermarket floor

that he was bound to use this or that precaution under these or those
circumstances. The standard which the defendant was bound to come
up to was a standard of specific acts or omissions, with reference to the
specific circumstances in which he found himself.

Id. at 124.
56
See Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049; 11 Exch. 780.
57
HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 111.
58
Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions, Association of Supreme Court Justices, N.Y.
Pattern Jury Instruction—Civil 2:10 (Dec. 2016 update). The corresponding California
instruction reads as follows:
Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care to prevent harm to
oneself or to others.
A person can be negligent by acting or by failing to act. A person is
negligent if he or she does something that a reasonably careful person
would not do in the same situation or fails to do something that a
reasonably careful person would do in the same situation.
You must decide how a reasonably careful person would have acted in
[name of plaintiff/defendant]’s situation.
Judicial Council of California, Civil Jury Instruction 401, Basic Standard of Care (Sept. 2003)
(Westlaw). See also Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions in Civil Cases,
Ill. Pattern Jury Instruction—Civil 10.01 (Westlaw).
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for newly fallen slippery debris.59 The instruction does not explain
whether the jury can forgive such errors on the theory that even
reasonably prudent people sometimes commit them. Each individual jury
must decide whether any given error was or was not negligence. Thus,
juries do have the power to forgive mistakes, but they are not usually told
that they have this power. They must infer the power under all the
circumstances of the case, not infer the power, or not exercise the power if
they have inferred it. The parties’ attorneys may make arguments to the
jury on this subject, but the judge typically tells them nothing in the
instructions about how to deal with it.60
California and other states have recently made significant changes in
their pattern jury instructions on medical malpractice, positively
suggesting to juries that they may forgive a doctor’s error. Suppose a
surgeon has failed to count the sponges placed in a patient and has left
one there.61 In California, the following instruction would now be proper:
[A/An] [insert type of medical practitioner] is not
necessarily negligent just because [his/her] efforts are
unsuccessful or [he/she] makes an error that was
reasonable under the circumstances. [A/An] [insert type
of medical practitioner] is negligent only if [he/she] was not
as skillful, knowledgeable, or careful as other reasonable
[insert type of medical practitioners] would have been in
similar circumstances.62

See HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 111.
See, e.g., Smith v. Canevary, 553 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
"unavoidable accident" instruction improper in Florida, and definition of negligence for jury
should track Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks language and should be kept simple); Shumaker
v. Johnson, 571 So. 2d 991 (Ala. 1990) (ruling "honest mistake" or "good faith error" by a
physician no longer good instruction in Alabama medical malpractice cases).
61
See Akridge v. Noble, 41 S.E. 78, 78 (Ga. 1902).
62
Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instruction 505, Success Not Required (new
Sept. 2003) (Westlaw). The Missouri Approved Jury Instruction (Civil) 21.01 (7th ed.)
provides as follows:
Your verdict must be for the plaintiff if you believe:
First, defendant (here set out act or omission complained of; e.g., “failed
to set plaintiff’s broken leg bones in natural alignment,” or “left a sponge
in plaintiff’s chest after performing an operation,” or “failed to
administer tetanus antitoxin”), and
Second, defendant was thereby negligent, and
Third, as a direct result of such negligence plaintiff sustained damage.
* [unless you believe plaintiff is not entitled to recover by reason of
Instruction Number ________(here insert number of affirmative defense
instruction)].
59
60
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This instruction actively encourages forgiveness of a “left sponge” error
because it asks the jury to consider whether the surgeon in question was
as careful as other surgeons who, as the jury may surmise, also
occasionally make the same type of error. The instruction encourages
evidence about the surgeon’s subjective thought processes, as John Austin
would have wished. Was this surgeon thinking about safety? Did his or
her colleagues believe that this surgeon was safety-minded?63 In this
realm, Austin’s subjective standard of negligence has seemingly replaced
Holmes’s objective standard.
This is not quite the revolution that it appears. In the medical
malpractice area, after trials in which verdicts have been challenged,
courts have long held in manifold ways that a party’s “mistakes” or
“errors” do not necessarily equate to negligence.64
B. The Asymmetry of Judgments as a Matter of Law
Holmes thought that courts’ peremptory judgments for plaintiffs
would be approximately equal in number to those for defendants. 65
Nevertheless, if we look closely at U.S. common-law breach of duty cases,
we find an astounding asymmetry. Although nonsuits and directed
verdicts for defendants are indeed common, directed verdicts and
judgments as a matter of law for plaintiffs are astonishingly rare. With
common-law negligence cases, which in the U.S. remain jury-eligible,
Although this instruction seems to be quite harsh on surgeons who have left sponges in their
patients, it cautions that the jury must also find that the surgeon was “negligent” in leaving
a sponge and requires that the following definition be read: “The term ‘negligent’ or
‘negligence’ as used in this [these] instruction[s] means the failure to use that degree of skill
and learning ordinarily used under the same or similar circumstances by the members of
defendant’s profession.” Id. A jury might reason that a surgeon who left a sponge would
not be negligent in doing so if he or she possessed the usual skill and learning. See id.
63
For a good example of this type of evidence exculpating a defendant whose conduct
was negligent, see A.C. ex rel. Cooper v. Bellingham Sch. Dist., 105 P.3d 400 (Wash. Ct. App.
2005) (noting many witnesses testified that defendant who unaccountably lost grip on a
piñata bat, which injured plaintiff, was nevertheless highly safety-minded).
64
See Terajima v. Torrance Mem’l Med. Ctr., No. B195298, 2008 WL 192650, at *2–6 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2008) (holding that mistakes do not equate to negligence after evidence
indicated and the defendant admitted many mistakes in treating plaintiff); Williamson v.
Prida, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 868 (Ct. App. 1999) (ruling negligence standard does not require
“proper care” or the absence of errors). An Oregon case stated the legal doctrine accurately
by approving the following jury instruction in a case in which a physician removed the
anesthesia tube from his aspiration-prone patient in a way that caused the patient to aspirate
his stomach contents: “A physician is liable for an error of judgment if the physician fails to
act with reasonable skill and care in exercising that judgment. A physician is not liable for
an error of judgment if the physician acts with reasonable care and skill in exercising such
judgment.” Rogers v. Meridian Park Hosp., 763 P.2d 400, 401 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding
jury verdict for physician).
65
See HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 128.
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judges are extremely reluctant to enter judgment as a matter of law for
plaintiffs. Such cases do exist in various states, but they are rare.
It would be easier to see this asymmetry in breach of duty cases if
casebooks were compiled differently. Torts casebook writers continue to
be highly influenced by Holmes’s theory of breach of duty even as they
fully recognize that an important part of it did not play out. Therefore,
when we read a Torts casebook, we often see Holmes’s theory validated,
as it were, by legerdemain. The main method is to include in the breach
of duty chapter several admiralty cases and Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) cases interlaced with common-law cases. Admiralty and FTCA
cases are ineligible for jury trial but are instead tried to judges. When the
breach of duty issue is always tried to judges, they develop a legal
standard of the type that would exist more generally if U.S. courts had
followed Holmes’s recommendation. A good example is the casebook
standard, The T.J. Hooper,66 one of many admiralty cases decided as a
matter of law for the plaintiff. It is highly misleading to include judgetried admiralty and FTCA cases as examples of a rule that is supposedly
applicable equally to jury-eligible common-law cases. In fact, the rules for
the common-law cases are quite different, as the following discussion will
explore.
C. The Reality of Negligence Litigation
The real law of negligence is quite different from Holmes’s theory and
was different even before Holmes wrote. It is asymmetrical in that courts
are quite willing to declare no breach of duty as a matter of law but highly
unwilling to establish the opposite, that is, breach of duty as a matter of
law. At precaution levels below the obviously adequate, juries possess
almost total discretion to find liability or not, and in this large zone there
is much inconsistency of decision that the courts wink at. This is perhaps
not the most obvious type of asymmetry, and possibly for this reason it
has been little remarked. It is, however, the most important feature of
negligence law. Courts police the negligence claims brought to them and
weed out the cases of unavoidable accident or non-negligently caused
66
The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (defendant committed breach of duty as
a matter of law when it failed to equip its tugboats with radio receiving sets). Two other
admiralty cases that are often included in casebooks are United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,
159 F.2d 169, 174 (2d Cir. 1947) (holding Conners Co. liable as a matter of law for failing to
have a bargee on board on the day of the accident), and Smith v. Lampe, 64 F.2d 201, 203 (6th
Cir. 1933) (granting judgment for defendant as matter of law because he was reasonably
ignorant of the customs of the sea). The T.J. Hooper and Carroll Towing are much more
misleading for an understanding of common-law negligence doctrine because judgments of
nonliability as a matter of law, as in Smith v. Lampe, are equally usual in common-law cases.
See, e.g., discussion infra Parts III.A, III.B (discussing Carroll Towing).
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harm. It is as if courts believe that their most important role is to avoid
creating incentives to overprecaution.
Whenever a plaintiff brings a negligence case, he or she will allege an
“accident signature,” a description that suggests in varying degrees that
the defendant may have been negligently responsible. It has long been
true that some alleged accident signatures by themselves can create a prima
facie case that will take the plaintiff’s case to a jury unless some further
undisputed assertion is made by the defendant. Examples of these “prima
facie accident signatures,” in historical order, are: (1) the defendant’s
stagecoach suddenly crashed because its axle broke, and the plaintiff, a
passenger, was thrown from it and was hurt;67 (2) the defendant’s hayrick
spontaneously combusted, and the fire spread to the plaintiff’s nearby
cottages and destroyed them;68 (3) one of the defendant’s pipes burst,
flooding the plaintiff’s premises; 69 (4) a barrel fell from the second-story
loading bay of the defendant’s warehouse and struck the plaintiff, a
pedestrian on the sidewalk below;70 and (5) the defendant surgeon
inadvertently failed to remove a surgical sponge from the plaintiff’s body,
which resulted in injury to the plaintiff.71
Simply because the accident signature creates a prima facie case does
not mean that the plaintiff will win. For three different reasons, the
plaintiff may still lose. First, before evidence is taken the defendant may
allege or prove undisputed new matter that destroys the prima facie case
made out by the accident signature. For instance, in the falling barrel case,
if the plaintiff introduced undisputed evidence that the barrel fell because
of a large earthquake that occurred at the same time as the accident, that
new matter would prevent the case from getting to trial. 72 Second, the
defendant may prove to the satisfaction of a court, either the court trying
the case or an appellate court, that the defendant’s conduct was not
objectively negligent. That was the situation in the bursting fire hydrant
case in which the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the appellate
court subsequently found that no reasonable precaution had been omitted
because at the time it was not reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that

Christie v. Griggs (1809) 170 Eng. Rep. 1088; 2 Camp. 79.
Vaughan v. Menlove (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490; 7 Car. & P. 525.
69
Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 1047; 11 Exch. 781.
70
Byrne v. Boadle (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299; 2 H. & C. 722.
71
Akridge v. Noble, 41 S.E. 78, 78 (Ga. 1902).
72
Cf. Hutchinson v. Boston Gaslight Co., 122 Mass. 219, 220, 1877 WL 10122 (1877)
(holding that evidence showing that defendant's gas main leaked and exploded, injuring
plaintiff, during Boston's Great Fire of 1872 failed to make out a prima facie case of
negligence). But see Fullerton v. Glens Falls Gas & Elec. Light Co., 141 N.Y.S. 838 (App. Div.
1913) (holding that plaintiff’s showing that defendant's gas main leaked during a normal
time and killed plaintiff's trees made out a prima facie case of negligence).
67
68
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its hydrant system could fail because of frost. 73 Third, a jury may find that
the defendant was not negligent. This was the situation in the case in
which the surgeon closed the plaintiff before retrieving all the sponges. 74
In approving this verdict and the judgment entered on it, the appellate
court stressed that the jury was entitled to find the defendant not guilty. 75
No evidence had been introduced suggesting that the defendant might
have some objective excuse or justification for his substandard conduct in
this case. Another surgeon testified that it was very difficult to find
sponges in a patient’s body, but that would not prevent the surgeon from
counting the sponges in and out. The defendant himself maintained that
he had diligently checked for sponges before closing the patient and
believed that he had retrieved all of them.76
These few cases explain a deep truth about the negligence rule. It is
not one rule but simultaneously two. For purposes of deciding whether
the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the standard of care is
objectively defined in terms of conduct. In Holmes’s words, the question
is whether the defendant’s conduct was on one side of the objectively
defined due care line or not. Nevertheless, if the defendant’s conduct was
objectively substandard, juries still possess the power in a wide range of
cases to find for the defendant. What to say about these jury acquittals of
defendants who have obviously engaged in substandard conduct? (1) We
could say that these affirmed defense verdicts represent a subjective side
of the negligence rule; or (2) we could think that juries that have acquitted
a defendant’s substandard conduct have “nullified” the true negligence
rule. Rather than accept either of these propositions, it is more accurate,
and certainly more parsimonious, to conclude that juries possess the power
to forgive negligence, not always, but in a wide range of cases. There is no
law of when forgiveness is warranted, only a widespread and judiciallyapproved practice that would have appalled Holmes.
Indeed, for centuries, juries have apparently possessed the power to
forgive negligence.77 As J. H. Baker and others have recorded, post-

See Blyth, 156 Eng. Rep. at 1049.
See Akridge, 41 S.E. at 78.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 78–80.
77
The great English legal historian J. H. Baker has written that the old rule of accidental
trespass was probably fault-based and that a defendant would be considered guilty only if
“he was to blame for it, first in the sense that he had caused it, and secondly in the sense that
with reasonable care he could have avoided it.” J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
HISTORY 459 (3d ed. 1990) [hereinafter BAKER, INTRODUCTION]. Baker also added that there
was no reason to believe that the trespass and trespass on the case entailed different
standards of culpability. He wrote, “There is no reason to suppose that the standard was
any different for trespass and case, since in either case it was left to the jury to decide
73
74
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verdict controls of the type exercised in Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co.
became common in England starting in the fifteenth century. 78 To the
extent that earlier common-law courts possessed fewer and lessdeveloped ways to control jury absolutions of substandard conduct, it is
possible that the modern liability rule is stricter than the classical rule.
III. THE LEARNED HAND FORMULA
A. The False Academic Conception of the Learned Hand Formula’s Role
Professor Henry T. Terry originally proposed that the cost-benefit
analysis of conduct should be the rule of decision in negligence cases. 79
Sixty years later Richard Posner embraced Judge Learned Hand’s gloss of
the breach of duty rule80 announced in the famous Carroll Towing case.81
Posner asserted that both judges and juries actually used—or could be
understood to use—the Learned Hand formula in all negligence cases. 82
This idea has been tremendously influential among legal economists and
even legal philosophers, some of whom have also embraced the Learned
Hand formula83 and variants of it.84 Under the sway of this scholarship,
the Restatement (Third) of Torts has recently adopted the Learned Hand
formula for all negligence cases, arguing that it is already the rule of
according to current notions of culpability.” Id. Baker also argued that there were a number
of successful “accident” pleas in the fourteenth century, but he conceded:
they all could be described as cases where the chain of causation was
broken by a force outside the defendant’s control: for instance, the
forces of combustion and wind (in fire cases), the perversity of animals
(in running-down cases), or the plaintiff’s own action (by moving in
front of a horse, a moving dagger, or an arrow).
Id. at 457.
78
See id. at 97–101; Morris S. Arnold, Law and Fact in the Medieval Jury Trial: Out of Sight,
Out of Mind, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 267, 267 (1974); Clinton W. Francis, The Structure of Judicial
Administration and the Development of Contract Law in Seventeenth-Century England, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 35, 63 (1983).
79
See Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40, 52 (1915).
80
See Posner, Theory of Negligence, supra note 10, at 38.
81
See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), rev’g Conners
Marine Co. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 66 F. Supp. 396 (E.D.N.Y. 1946).
82
In describing the formative Gilded Age negligence cases, Posner wrote: “The jury's
function was not limited to finding the facts; it was also responsible for deciding whether the
facts found constituted negligence. It was the jurors who applied, within certain broad limits
set by the judge, the Hand formula.” Posner, Theory of Negligence, supra note 10, at 51.
83
See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 J. L. & PHIL. 37, 37
(1983) (arguing that the Learned Hand formula is consistent with Immanuel Kant’s
corrective-justice philosophy).
84
See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution beyond the Point of Cost-Justification, 56
VAND. L. REV. 653, 657 (2003) (arguing that courts and juries should refer to cost-benefit
analysis and then require precaution a bit beyond what cost-benefit analysis requires).
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decision or should be.85 Because it would eliminate jury forgiveness of
errors, this rule would be much harsher than the actual rule now in
existence.86
If the Learned Hand formula is the rule in all negligence cases, one
puzzle is why negligence jury instructions do not refer to cost-benefit
analysis. As already noted, they continue to use the less precise
“reasonable” or “prudent” person test first announced in Blyth v.
Birmingham Waterworks.87 The mystery is compounded when we see that
many courts give a Learned Hand formula instruction in products liability
cases involving allegedly defective product designs. 88 Courts know how
to give cost-benefit jury instructions; they simply do not do so in ordinary
negligence cases.
B. The Learned Hand Formula as a Decision Rule for Triers of Fact
In debates between legal philosophers and legal economists about the
negligence rule, it has seldom been stressed that United States v. Carroll
The Restatement (Third) of Torts states:
A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care
under all the circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining
whether the person's conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable
likelihood that the person's conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable
severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to
eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST.
2010). The comments to this section cite to numerous cases and statutes that supposedly
embrace the Learned Hand formula as the accepted rule of decision in negligence cases.
86
If juries were required to use the Learned Hand formula in all cases, presumably they
would have to convict every surgeon who left a sponge in a patient because, on a one-time
basis, the burden of removing it would be less than the reduction in risk from doing so. Such
a rule would benefit members of the plaintiffs’ bar, who would win more cases, and perhaps
even members of the defense bar, who might be able to litigate more cases. It seems probable
that some medical malpractice cases involving routine practitioner errors are not litigated
under the current regime because of the high probability that a jury would forgive the error
in question. Defense lawyers could gain litigation fees from a less forgiving rule of decision.
For instance, in all cases of retained foreign objects, it would become a litigable issue what
the plaintiff’s damages were. See, e.g., infra Part VII.
87
Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049; 11 Exch. 781.
88
For instance, California Civil Jury Instructions (BAJI)—Civ. 9.00.5 (2018) provides in
part:
In determining whether the benefits of the design outweigh its risks,
you should consider, among other things, the gravity of the danger
posed by the design, the likelihood that the danger would cause
damage, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternate design at the time
of manufacture, the financial cost of an improved design, and the
adverse consequences to the product and the consumer that would
result from an alternate design.
Id. Nothing like this instruction is recommended for a negligence case.
85
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Towing Co. was an admiralty case.89 As mandated by admiralty law, no
jury was involved. The famous Learned Hand opinion found that the
Conners Marine Company, the owner and lessor of the barge Anna C, was
negligent as a matter of law for the absence of its bargee. This liability was
joint with that of two other admiralty defendants, the Grace Line and the
Carroll Company. The district judge had no difficulty finding the latter
two defendants liable as a matter of law (the only kind of liability that
exists in admiralty law) because of their compliance error in failing to tie
secure knots that would have prevented the Anna C from breaking loose.90
If the case had been tried under common law, a jury might have forgiven
these two harried workers’ negligence.
The issue for Judge Hand was whether the Conners Company was
jointly liable (with the Grace Line and the Carroll Company) for the loss
of its own barge and for the government cargo loaded aboard it. In
deciding that the Conners Company had also breached a duty, Judge
Hand reconciled similar cases on the same specific subject, that is, when it
was a breach of duty for a bargee to be absent from his barge. Hand’s
approach would have won Holmes’s approval because Hand adopted a
highly precedential view of this question. After analyzing the facts of
twelve previously decided absent bargee cases,91 he then glossed their
89
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 170 (2d Cir. 1947), rev’g Conners
Marine Co. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 66 F. Supp. 396 (E.D.N.Y. 1946).
90
See id. at 174.
91
Judge Hand’s analysis of the precedent bearing on whether a bargee’s absence
constitutes a breach of duty deserves full quotation because nothing like it exists in commonlaw cases. This was the type of analysis that Holmes envisioned for the common law, which
under his recommendation would limit jury decisions (which, again, do not exist in
admiralty cases):
As to the consequences of a bargee’s absence from his barge there have
been a number of decisions; and we cannot agree that it is never ground
for liability even to other vessels who may be injured. As early as 1843,
Judge Sprague in Clapp v. Young, held a schooner liable which broke
adrift from her moorings in a gale in Provincetown Harbor, and ran
down another ship. The ground was that the owners of the offending
ship had left no one on board, even though it was the custom in that
harbor not to do so. Judge Tenney in Fenno v. The Mary E. Cuff, treated
it as one of several faults against another vessel which was run down,
to leave the offending vessel unattended in a storm in Port Jefferson
Harbor. Judge Thomas in The On-the-Level, held liable for damage to a
stake-boat, a barge moored to the stake-boat “south of Liberty Light, off
the Jersey shore,” because she had been left without a bargee; indeed he
declared that the bargee’s absence was “gross negligence.” In the
Kathryn B. Guinan, Ward, J., did indeed say that, when a barge was made
fast to a pier in the harbor, as distinct from being in open waters, the
bargee’s absence would not be the basis for the owner’s negligence.
However, the facts in that case made no such holding necessary; the
offending barge in fact had a bargee aboard though he was asleep. In
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the Beeko, Judge Campbell exonerated a power boat which had no
watchman on board, which boys had maliciously cast loose from her
moorings at the Marine Basin in Brooklyn and which collided with
another vessel. Obviously that decision has no bearing on the facts at
bar. In United States Trucking Corporation v. City of New York, the same
judge refused to reduce the recovery of a coal hoister, injured at a foul
berth, because the engineer was not on board; he had gone home for the
night as was apparently his custom. We reversed the decree, but for
another reason. In The Sadie, we affirmed Judge Coleman’s holding that
it was actionable negligence to leave without a bargee on board a barge
made fast outside another barge, in the face of storm warnings. The
damage was done to the inside barge. In The P. R. R. No. 216, we charged
with liability a lighter which broke loose from, or was cast off, by a
tanker to which she was moored, on the ground that her bargee should
not have left her over Sunday. He could not know when the tanker
might have to cast her off. We carried this so far in The East Indian, as to
hold a lighter whose bargee went ashore for breakfast, during which the
stevedores cast off some of the lighter’s lines. True, the bargee came
back after she was free and was then ineffectual in taking control of her
before she damaged another vessel; but we held his absence itself a fault,
knowing as he must have, that the stevedores were apt to cast off the
lighter. The Conway No. 23 went on the theory that the absence of the
bargee had no connection with the damage done to the vessel itself; it
assumed liability, if the contrary had been proved. In The Trenton, we
refused to hold a moored vessel because another outside of her had
overcharged her fasts. The bargee had gone away for the night when a
storm arose; and our exoneration of the offending vessel did depend
upon the theory that it was not negligent for the bargee to be away for
the night; but no danger was apparently then to be apprehended. In
Bouker Contracting Co. v. Williamsburgh Power Plant Corporation, we
charged a scow with half damages because her bargee left her without
adequate precautions. In O’Donnell Transportation Co. v. M. & J. Tracy,
we refused to charge a barge whose bargee had been absent from 9 A.M.
to 1:30 P.M., having “left the vessel to go ashore for a time on his own
business.”
Id. at 172–73 (footnotes omitted). Judge Hand concluded this precedential analysis by
declaring as follows:
It appears from the foregoing review that there is no general rule to
determine when the absence of a bargee or other attendant will make
the owner of the barge liable for injuries to other vessels if she breaks
away from her moorings. However, in any cases where he would be so
liable for injuries to others obviously he must reduce his damages
proportionately, if the injury is to his own barge. It becomes apparent
why there can be no such general rule, when we consider the grounds
for such a liability. Since there are occasions when every vessel will
break from her moorings, and since, if she does, she becomes a menace
to those about her; the owner’s duty, as in other similar situations, to
provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The
probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting
injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it
serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends
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legal doctrine with his famous formula. His approach instantiates what
we would see more generally if common-law courts had adopted, rather
than rejected, Holmes’s recommendation of a precedential standard of
due care. Nevertheless, if the issue of the absent bargee had come before
a common-law court and the jury had forgiven his absence, a commonlaw court would have affirmed that acquittal. If a jury can acquit a
surgeon who has left a scalpel in a patient, it can equally acquit an
attendant who has left a barge. Carroll Towing would have been decided
differently under those circumstances.
Many textbook and casebook authors have assumed that the
negligence rule is much the same whether a case arises under the common
law of negligence, where in the U.S. a jury is involved, or under a statute
or body of law in which judges decide cases without juries. The principal
examples are admiralty cases that involve collisions between ships and
FTCA cases, which involve accidents caused by the federal government’s
negligence. In these systems there can be no jury forgiveness of errors
because juries are not involved. In these cases, the breach of duty standard
upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.
Applied to the situation at bar, the likelihood that a barge will break
from her fasts and the damage she will do, vary with the place and time;
for example, if a storm threatens, the danger is greater; so it is, if she is
in a crowded harbor where moored barges are constantly being shifted
about. On the other hand, the barge must not be the bargee’s prison,
even though he lives aboard; he must go ashore at times. We need not
say whether, even in such crowded waters as New York Harbor a bargee
must be aboard at night at all; it may be that the custom is otherwise, as
Ward, J., supposed in “The Kathryn B. Guinan,” supra; and that, if so,
the situation is one where custom should control. We leave that
question open; but we hold that it is not in all cases a sufficient answer
to a bargee’s absence without excuse, during working hours, that he has
properly made fast his barge to a pier, when he leaves her. In the case
at bar the bargee left at five o’clock in the afternoon of January 3rd, and
the flotilla broke away at about two o’clock in the afternoon of the
following day, twenty-one hours afterwards. The bargee had been
away all the time, and we hold that his fabricated story was affirmative
evidence that he had no excuse for his absence. At the locus in quo—
especially during the short January days and in the full tide of war
activity—barges were being constantly “drilled” in and out. Certainly
it was not beyond reasonable expectation that, with the inevitable haste
and bustle, the work might not be done with adequate care. In such
circumstances we hold—and it is all that we do hold—that it was a fair
requirement that the Conners Company should have a bargee aboard
(unless he had some excuse for his absence), during the working hours
of daylight.
Id. at 173–74 (footnotes omitted). Judge Hand offered his Learned Hand formula as a “general rule”
for absent bargee cases, but he phrased it so generally that it is obvious he thought it applied
beyond that context. Id. at 173.
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is much more objective and much more symmetrical. When a federal
government surgeon leaves a foreign object in his patient, and there is no
issue of whether the damages were caused by the lapse, the case results in
judgment as a matter of law for the patient.92 Similarly, judges in FTCA
cases based on misfilled prescriptions routinely order judgment as a
matter of law for plaintiffs when the damages were caused by error. 93
These same cases often result in jury forgiveness when they are tried
through the ordinary negligence common-law process.94

92
See Vines v. United States, No. 2:05-cv-02370-FCD-GGH, 2008 WL 4470795, at *4–5 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 2, 2008) (holding judgment as a matter of law for plaintiff on breach of duty issue
against surgeon who inadvertently left “small wire” in patient’s back); Gills v. United States,
No. 7:08-cv-00245, 2010 WL 1444590, at *4 (W.D. Va. Apr. 9, 2010) (finding negligence as a
matter of law for leaving sponge in patient, but plaintiff unable to prove sponge was cause
in fact of death); Kellar v. U.S. Dep’t Veteran’s Affairs, No. 08-cv-00761-WYD-KLM, 2010 WL
3785569, at *7 (D. Colo. Sept. 17, 2010) (determining breach of duty as a matter of law for
leaving metal clamp in patient’s chest). See also McCubbin v. Hastings, 27 La. Ann. 713, 719
(1875) (ordering judgment as a matter of law for plaintiff who sued pharmacist for
dispensing error when case had been tried to judge); Dietze v. King, 184 F. Supp. 944, 949–
50 (E.D. Va. 1960) (ordering judgment as a matter of law for plaintiff in diversity case where
surgeon had left small sponge in patient). Cf. Prindle v. United States, No. 4:10-CV-054-A,
2011 WL 1869795, at *2 n.1 (N.D. Tex. May 13, 2011) (opining judgment as a matter of law
would be given for plaintiff in FTCA case in which plaintiff suffered damage from surgeon
leaving a foreign object in his body). But see Callahan v. Cho, 437 F. Supp. 2d 557, 565 (E.D.
Va. 2006) (requiring FTCA plaintiff to comply with West Virginia malpractice reform statute,
which required expert statement to create triable issue of fact, in a case where the Veterans
Administration surgeon left small needle tip in his body because it could not be easily
removed).
93
See Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 382 (2d Cir. 1998) (Calabresi, J.) (entitling
plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law in FTCA case when Navy hospital pharmacy
dispensed twice the recommended dose to her decedent); Boyle v. United States, 948 F. Supp.
2d 570, 570 (D.S.C. 2012) (ruling for plaintiff in FTCA case after Navy pharmacist accidently
dispensed ten times prescribed dose to plaintiffs’ deceased); Boyle v. United States, 948 F.
Supp. 2d 577, 584 (D.S.C. 2012) (providing separate order for damages in previous case);
Espinosa v. United States, No. 00 C 3435, 2001 WL 1518536, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2001)
(determining, in FTCA case, that Veterans Administration pharmacist committed breach of
duty as a matter of law, by filling prescription with incorrect dose of drug, but also holding
incorrect dose was not cause in fact of injury), aff’d, 47 F. App’x 402, 405, 2002 WL 31027954
(7th Cir. Sept. 9, 2002).
94
See infra notes 150–54 and accompanying text.
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IV. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AS THE MAIN CONSTRAINT ON JURIES’ BREACH
OF DUTY DETERMINATIONS
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Ground for Judgment as a Matter of Law for the
Defendant
Many commentators have noticed that cost-benefit analysis and the
Learned Hand formula are absent in negligence jury instructions. 95 They
have sometimes inferred that both are irrelevant to the common law of
negligence. That is incorrect. It is true that in negligence cases judges do
not ask juries to do cost-benefit analysis, but cost-benefit analysis is still
the most important general principle defining common-law breach of
duty. The true role of cost-benefit analysis in jury-eligible cases is not to
be the jury’s decision rule but to be applied by judges to limit the cases in
which juries can find negligence liability. Juries are indeed allowed to
forgive the nonuse of a cost-beneficial precaution, but they are not
permitted to require the use of precautions beyond the balance of costbenefit analysis. This is undoubtedly a very permissive standard, and we
will explore at the end of this Article what has probably caused the courts
to adopt it.
As just noted, however, the most important ways in which courts use
cost-benefit analysis are to dismiss a case before trial and to reject a jury
verdict that reflects the jury’s view that the defendant should have used
precaution beyond the demands of cost-benefit analysis. From a very
early point in the history of the modern negligence rule, courts—and
therefore litigants—have focused on specific untaken precautions.96
Many grounds for a defense summary judgment exist. These include
the absence of a duty by the defendant, the absence of proximate cause,
95
See Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1016–18 (1994);
Michael D. Green, Negligence = Economic Efficiency: Doubts >, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1605, 1630–31
(1997); Patrick J. Kelley, The Carroll Towing Company Case and the Teaching of Tort Law, 45
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 731, 757 (2001); Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula
Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 815–16 (2001);
Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries about Negligence: A Review of
Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 618–19 (2002); Richard W. Wright, Hand,
Posner, and the Myth of the "Hand Formula," 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 145, 151–52, 161–62
(2003); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999, 2005–06 (2007);
Kenneth W. Simons, Tort Negligence, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Tradeoffs: A Closer Look at the
Controversy, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1171, 1222 (2008).
96
See, e.g., Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1047–49; 11
Exch. 780 (holding that cleaning frost off a fire plug was not required, despite jury verdict to
contrary, because no experience demonstrated that the precaution was useful); Crafter v.
Metropolitan Ry. Co. (1866) 1 LRCP 300, 301–05 (Eng.) (finding, despite a jury verdict to the
contrary, that defendant was not required to install handrail on staircase, replace the wornout brass nosing on the staircase, or install nosing made of more durable material than brass).
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the presence of assumption of the risk, and so forth. Especially in the
modern era, courts are not totally consistent in how they characterize
factual issues and how they sort them among the elements of negligence,
which are usually taken to be duty, breach of duty, cause in fact, proximate
cause, and actual harm. Nevertheless, courts almost always give reasons
for their conclusion of no liability as a matter of law, and the reason in
which we are interested is whether the defendant used adequate
precaution in the situation that led to the plaintiff’s harm.
In cases in which courts concern themselves with the adequacy of the
defendant’s precautions to assess whether the defendant deserved
judgment as a matter of law, the most common grounds for this
conclusion are: (1) the burden of additional precautions was outweighed
by the reduction in risk that would have been produced by them; (2) the
risk that harmed the plaintiff was “unforeseeable,” which in this context
usually means very small from an ex ante point of view; (3) the plaintiff
failed to identify an untaken precaution or other fault by the defendant in
a case in which res ipsa was unavailable; (4) the risk that harmed the
plaintiff was “obvious” to the plaintiff; (5) the undisputed facts showed
that the defendant used due care; (6) expert evidence was required to
show breach of duty, and it was absent on the record; and (7) the
defendant’s act that caused the harm was involuntary. The first of these
grounds for summary judgment invokes cost-benefit analysis and the
Learned Hand formula, but especially given the usual context of analysis
under each of these seven heads, all can be understood as suggesting the
court’s conclusion that no precaution untaken by the defendant would
have paid out its costs in terms of reduced ex ante risk.
1.

The Burden of Additional Precautions was Outweighed by the
Reduction in Risk that Would Have Been Produced by Them

For a court to conclude that the burden of additional precautions was
greater than the reduction in ex ante risk entails cost-benefit analysis. This
type of analysis is more prominent in older cases. Nevertheless, modern
cases seem to adopt the same cost-benefit perspective even when they are
less explicit about it. The reader will be able to judge the validity of this
point from the following discussion.
Adams v. Bullock97 was a famous case that used the Learned Hand
formula’s reasoning well before the formula existed. The case was
decided by Judge Cardozo in 1919 and concerned a young plaintiff who
sued the defendant for injuries he sustained when a wire that he was
swinging came into contact with the defendant’s trolley wires.
97

Adams v. Bullock, 125 N.E. 93, 93–94 (N.Y. 1919).
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The defendant ran a trolley line in the city of Dunkirk, New York,
employing an overhead wire system. At one point, the road was crossed
by a bridge that carried the tracks of the Nickel Plate and Pennsylvania
railroads. Pedestrians often used the bridge as a shortcut between streets,
and children played on it. On April 21, 1916, the plaintiff, a twelve-yearold boy, came across the bridge, swinging an eight-foot wire. In swinging
it, he hit the defendant’s trolley wire, which ran beneath the structure. The
side of the bridge was protected by a parapet eighteen inches wide. The
trolley wire was strung four feet, seven and three-fourths inches below the
top of the parapet. The plaintiff was shocked and burned when the wires
came together.98 The trial court sent the case to the jury, which returned a
verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed arguing that the
evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.
The Court of Appeals of New York held for the defendant, finding
insufficient evidence to support the plaintiff’s verdict.99 In rejecting
liability, Judge Cardozo performed a cost-benefit analysis based on the
low probability of the accident, given the precautions the defendant had
already taken, and the impracticality of guarding the wires. He stressed
that the trolley wires needed to be uninsulated to power the trolleys and
that guards would be very costly because the actual location of the
accident was not that much more likely than anyplace else along the
trolley line. Given the low probability of any accident of the type that
occurred, the potential reduction in risk from any further precaution
would be small relative to the large cost of guarding the trolley wires
throughout the system.100 Therefore, the jury verdict of liability could not
be accepted.

98
99
100

Id. at 93.
Id.
See id. Cardozo wrote:
The trolley wire was so placed that no one standing on the bridge or
even bending over the parapet could reach it. Only some extraordinary
casualty, not fairly within the area of ordinary prevision, could make it
a thing of danger. Reasonable care in the use of a destructive agency
imports a high degree of vigilance (Nelson v. Branford L. & W. Co., 75
Conn. 548, 551; Braun v. Buffalo Gen. El. Co., 200 N.Y. 484). But no
vigilance, however alert, unless fortified by the gift of prophecy, could
have predicted the point upon the route where such an accident would
occur. It might with equal reason have been expected anywhere else.
At any point upon the route, a mischievous or thoughtless boy might
touch the wire with a metal pole, or fling another wire across it (Green
v. W.P. Rys. Co., 246 Penn. St. 340). If unable to reach it from the walk,
he might stand upon a wagon or climb upon a tree. No special danger
at this bridge warned the defendant that there was need of special
measures of precaution. No like accident had occurred before. No

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2019

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 3 [2019], Art. 2

572

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

Cooley v. Public Service Co.101 was a similar case that also used the
objective standard of cost-benefit analysis to reject the plaintiff’s alleged
untaken durable precautions. The plaintiff suffered trauma from a loud
noise that came over her telephone line; the most immediate cause was a
power company’s high voltage line breaking in a storm and making
contact with the telephone wire over which the plaintiff was speaking.
She sued both the electric company and the power company. The plaintiff
suggested two durable precautions as untaken and as alternatively
constituting both defendants’ breach of duty: (1) the power company’s
failure to insulate its power wires; and (2) both defendants’ failure to place
a mesh basket underneath the power wires at places where they were
close to the telephone wires so that if the power wires broke they would
not touch the adjacent telephone wire. 102 The jury returned a verdict for
the telephone company, but against the power company, which appealed
based on insufficiency of the evidence of breach of duty.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected both untaken
precautions under a cost-benefit analysis.103 The court reasoned, based on
the evidence, that both precautions would have increased the risk of
electrocution to pedestrians underneath the power lines by keeping the
lines live after they had been breached, increasing the likelihood that a
pedestrian would become the ground that would break the circuit and cut
off the electricity. Because the increased risk of electrocution would have
been greater than the reduction in the risk from noise trauma, neither
precaution was cost-beneficial and was therefore rejected.104 The court
custom had been disregarded. We think that ordinary caution did not
involve forethought of this extraordinary peril.
Id. Cardozo also said:
There is, we may add, a distinction not to be ignored between electric
light and trolley wires. The distinction is that the former may be
insulated. Chance of harm, though remote, may betoken negligence, if
needless. Facility of protection may impose a duty to protect. With
trolley wires, the case is different. Insulation is impossible.
Id.
101
Cooley v. Pub. Serv. Co., 10 A.2d 673 (N.H. 1940).
102
Id. at 674–75.
103
See id. at 673.
104
Id. at 677. The court said:
In the case before us, there was danger of electrocution in the street. As
long as the Telephone Company’s safety devices are properly installed
and maintained, there is no danger of electrocution in the house. The
only foreseeable danger to the telephone subscriber is from noise-fright
and neurosis. Balancing the two, the danger to those such as the plaintiff
is remote, that to those on the ground near the broken wires is obvious
and immediate. The balance would not be improved by taking a chance
to avoid traumatic neurosis of the plaintiff at the expense of greater risk
to the lives of others.
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stressed that some cost-beneficial untaken precaution might have existed,
but it was the plaintiff’s burden to offer and prove it. Again, the jury
verdict of negligence could not be accepted.
The Cooley case is interesting from at least two points of view. First,
the court used a more sophisticated economic analysis of breach of duty
than Judge Hand when he announced his formula seven years later. The
Cooley court understood the cost of precaution in its full economic sense,
which is the “opportunity cost.” The cost of a precaution, or of anything,
is value forgone by having it. The value forgone by mesh baskets is not
just their expense but also, and mainly, the lives that would be lost from
electrocution if the mesh baskets were installed, just as the court reasoned.
Second, Cooley seems in tension with at least some corrective justice
theories of tort. The Cooley decision required the power company to use
telephone subscribers as a means of providing benefits for pedestrians.
Immanuel Kant would be concerned about this aspect of the case because
he argued that one’s first duty is to treat other humans as ends only and
not as means to improve others’ welfare.
Beginning in the last century, some courts have begun to develop a
precedential standard of breach of duty. This is not the comprehensive
standard that Holmes envisioned but instead a standard that gives
guidance to courts about when it is proper for courts to order judgment as
a matter of law for a defendant. Again, Holmes argued that courts should
develop a precedential standard of breach of duty that would define three
different zones for various accident types: (1) a zone in which judgment
as a matter of law for the plaintiff was proper; (2) an ever-shrinking
intermediate zone in which a jury would be permitted to find either for
the plaintiff or the defendant; and (3) a zone in which precedent would
indicate that judgment as a matter of law for the defendant is proper. 105
The relatively modern development concerns only the third zone. Thus,
this body of law sets an upper limit for precaution requirements that juries
may enforce. California, long known for its progressive jurisprudence, is
a good example.
The most recent origin of California’s limits on jury-established
precaution requirements comes from the 1968 case of Rowland v.
Christian,106 which expanded duties of care in the context of premises
liability. This case recited a list of “policy factors” that should be
considered in deciding the negligence issue of “duty.” 107 In its original

Id. at 676.
See generally HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 2.
106
See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
107
See id. at 567. The court said:
105
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use, the Rowland court used the policy list to reject a categorical rule of
duty, namely, that apartment renters owe a very limited duty to their
social guests. The Rowland v. Christian court replaced this rule with the
policy list, thus expanding the realm in which juries could hold land
occupiers liable to their social guests. Since Rowland v. Christian was
decided in 1968, courts have used the policy list announced in that case to
create semi-categorical rules that limit juries’ powers to find negligence in
different situations, virtually the opposite of the list’s original use. In this
modern use of the Rowland list, the two most important policy factors have
been “the foreseeability of the harm” and “the extent of the burden to the
defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to
exercise care.” These two elements are the main components of Judge
Hand’s cost-benefit analysis in Carroll Towing.
As later California Supreme Court cases have recognized,108 Nevarez
v. Thriftimart, Inc.,109 was one of the first cases in this new line defining
limited “duties” based on cost-benefit considerations. The three-year-old
plaintiff lived with his family directly across from a large shopping center
at which the defendant held a grand opening of its new supermarket. As
a part of the celebration, the defendant hired carnival rides, such as a
Tinkertown train, a merry-go-round, and a Ferris wheel, and also gave
away free treats, such as ice cream and popcorn. The plaintiff, supervised
by his grandmother, attended the festival the morning of the accident. The
group returned for lunch, and in the early afternoon the plaintiff escaped
his minders to get back to the fun and jaywalked across the street dividing
his home and the shopping center. A speeding car struck him
immediately as he dashed out between two parked cars. 110 He sued both
the driver who struck him and the supermarket, and the jury returned a
verdict against both for negligence.111 The reported case arose on the
A departure from this fundamental principle [that, supposedly,
everyone always owes a duty whenever his or her precaution could
foreseeably reduce risk] involves the balancing of a number of
considerations; the major ones are the foreseeability of harm to the
plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the
closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the
injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct,
the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the
defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to
exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost,
and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.

Id. at 564.
See, e.g., Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church, 404 P.3d 1196, 1200–01 (Cal. 2017)
(discussing Nevarez in a similar case).
109
See Nevarez v. Thriftman, 87 Cal. Rptr. 50 (Ct. App. 1970).
110
See id. at 51–52.
111
Id. at 51.
108
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supermarket’s motion for judgment n.o.v. On the appeal, the plaintiff
analogized to then-recent cases in which roving ice cream and donut
sellers were held liable for failing to protect the young customers they
sought to attract. The Nevarez court reversed the judgment for the plaintiff
against the supermarket because it owed no “duty.” The court said that
the burden of controlling the entire perimeter of a shopping center was
much greater and less practical than the burden of controlling the
relatively small area surrounding an ice cream truck.112 Once again, a
jury’s verdict could not be accepted because the alleged untaken
precaution exceeded the requirements of cost-benefit analysis.
The traditional idea is that negligence duties are defined by very
general considerations such as whether the defendant committed an
affirmative act, whether there was an undertaking, whether a special
relationship existed between the parties, and so forth. Breach of duty, on
the other hand, depends on “fact-specific” considerations such as whether
under the detailed circumstances of the accident the defendant used
sufficient precaution. The Nevarez court’s analysis straddled these two
levels. On the one hand, the court seemed to lay down a general rule
finding no duty for stationary vendors that attracted children; on the other
hand, the court based this conclusion on the cost-benefit considerations
that are more traditional in breach of duty determinations. Still, the
Nevarez court’s holding made good sense as a duty rule because it was
fairly categorical. Subsequent California cases have obliterated the
categorical approach.
A good example of the latter type of case is Parsons v. Crown Disposal
Co.113 The defendant’s trash collector clamorously emptied his bin near
the Griffith Park Equestrian Trail when plaintiff was nearby on his horse.
The driver could not easily see plaintiff behind his truck. When the bin
emptied, the horse bolted and threw the plaintiff, causing the injuries for

See id. at 51. The Nevarez court’s specific language was as follows:
To impose a duty of care of the nature contended for by respondent
would be to place an unjustifiable burden upon any businessman whose
store displays toys or other things attractive to children. Indeed, since
small children are notoriously curious about and attracted to anything
and everything, the limits to such a duty, if imposed, are not readily
visible. Retail establishment would be cast in the role of a modern-day
Pied Piper and, as such, obligated to act as parent or babysitter for every
tot in the neighborhood who might decide to dash across a public street
in order to bask in the store's allure. The attractions offered by appellant
and the generalized invitation to enjoy them, thus do not analogize to
the conduct of a street vendor.
Id. at 54.
113
Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70 (Cal. 1997).
112
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which he sued.114 This case would have been different if defendant had
seen plaintiff because then the burden was relatively low to delay lift.
Untaken precautions suggested by plaintiff were very burdensome. These
included changing the hours of collection, temporarily blocking off the
trash collection zone with warning signs, and providing collection
schedules to equestrians.115 The trial court granted summary judgment to
defendant, which was affirmed by the California Supreme Court. 116 The
California Supreme Court basically performed a Learned Hand formula
analysis, stressing that it would be too great a burden to use any of the
precautions that the plaintiff alleged as untaken. 117
Although in this case there was “no duty,” the court made clear that
if the trash truck driver had seen the equestrian and his horse before
dumping the load, the case would have been decided differently because
then the burden of merely delaying the dump into the truck would have
been low. Thus, although the purported rule related to “duty,” it was not
very categorical. The case basically held that failing to look for skittish
horses could not be a breach of duty under the detailed circumstances of
the case because that untaken precaution, and the others alleged by the
plaintiff, flunked the Learned Hand formula.
2.

The Risk that Harmed the Plaintiff was “Unforeseeable,” which in this
Context Usually Means Very Small from an Ex Ante Point of View

Under the Learned Hand formula and cost-benefit analysis more
generally, the relevant question is whether some untaken precaution
would have cost less than the risk it would have eliminated. In this
context, the risk eliminated is inevitably estimated from an ex ante point
of view as of a time before the accident when the untaken precaution could
have been adopted. It follows that if, as of that time, no risk was
foreseeable from failing to adopt the precaution, then no breach of duty
can be based on the untaken precaution in question. Thus, judicial
assertions that the risk was “unforeseeable” can be sensibly understood as
a truncated form of cost-benefit analysis. Recall that the purpose of this
analysis arises in some sort of summary adjudication or review of the
evidence presented at trial to ensure that a jury does not exceed the
requirements of cost-benefit analysis.

114
115
116
117

Id. at 71.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 81.
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A good example of this analysis is found in Blyth v. Birmingham
Waterworks Co. (1856).118 The defendant could have seen frosted plugs on
its fire hydrant system as a danger sign because, if the plugs were frozen
shut when the water around the plugs froze, the expanding ice could
break the pipes.119 If the defendant’s employees had simply cleaned the
frost off the stoppers, the accident would have been prevented because the
stoppers would have been able to move forward in their iron tubes, which
would have relieved the pressure of the expanding ice and prevented the
bursting of the pipes and the plaintiff’s damage. Although the untaken
precaution was cheap, the court found it was not required because the
defendant’s employees had no practical way of foreseeing the probable
consequences of their omitted precaution.120 The cold spell of 1855 was
unprecedented, so the water company employees reasonably lacked the
knowledge that cleaning the plugs would have reduced any significant
risk to those living close to the pipes.121 There are many similar cases that
have prevented juries from finding liability, just as in Blyth.122
The defendant had installed an early fire hydrant system that entailed punching fire
plugs in its subterranean wooden water pipes. In 1855, when the system was still relatively
new, the weather in England turned extraordinarily frigid, and the stoppers on the plugs
frosted over. See Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1047–49;
11 Exch. 781.
In this case, the court defined negligence in the highly objective way of which Holmes
approved. One hundred and sixty years later this text from the opinion is still a common
jury instruction in the United States:
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do. The defendants might have
been liable for negligence, if, unintentionally, they omitted to do that
which a reasonable person would have done, or did that which a person
taking reasonable precautions would not have done.
Id. at 1049.
119
That is what happened in the actual case, and a large quantity of water leaked from the
municipal pipes into the basement of the plaintiff who sued for negligence. Id. at 1047–49.
120
Id. at 1049.
121
See id. A hydraulic engineer would have possessed this knowledge, but the employees
were not chargeable with this degree of expertise. Id. at 1049.
122
See Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 177 N.E. 416, 417 (N.Y. 1931) (Cardozo, J.)
(holding that defendant’s employee did not need to pre-announce changes in position
because plaintiff should have looked where she was walking; risk from failure of employee
to pre-announce was “unforeseeable”); Collins v. Noss, 15 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476 (App. Div. 1939)
(holding that a risk that anyone would be hurt by small floor defect was “unforeseeable”);
Danielenko v. Kinney Rent A Car, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 1073, 1075–76 (N.Y. 1982) (holding that
risk to rental company that its car would contain bomb planted by saboteur was “not
foreseeable”); Moeske v. Nalley, 744 N.Y.S.2d 251, 252–53 (App. Div. 2002) (holding that risk
to plaintiff, who had unobviously jumped on defendant’s back bumper to assist in
emergency, was “unforeseeable” to defendant); Pitre v. Empl’rs Liab. Assurance Corp., 234
So. 2d 847, 853 (La. Ct. App. 1970) (finding risk that plaintiff’s decedent would be hurt by
118
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The Plaintiff Failed to Identify an Untaken Precaution or Other Fault
by the Defendant in a Case in which Res Ipsa was Unavailable

The most traditional form of cost-benefit analysis examines the cost
and benefit of a specific untaken precaution. 123 When the plaintiff has
alleged no untaken precaution, this analysis becomes impossible, and
courts often nonsuit plaintiffs for this reason.124 A more basic reason for
summary judgment for the defendant is when the plaintiff has failed
unreasonably to identify any untaken precaution by the defendant that
could have prevented the injury.125
4.

The Risk that Harmed the Plaintiff was “Obvious” to the Plaintiff

Another common reason why defendants are granted summary
judgment is when the hazard on the defendant’s premises was obvious. 126
thrower’s windup at carnival baseball throw was “unforeseeable” and did not require special
precautions); Birchfield v. Sweatt, No. F052443, 2008 WL 698925, at *5–9 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar.
17, 2008) (finding risk of giving hair-trigger pistol to daughter to protect herself created
“unforeseeable” risk that her boyfriend, trained as army sniper, would intentionally or
accidentally shoot himself); Keith v. City of Pleasant Hill, No. A137044, 2013 WL 5569993, at
*3 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2013) (declaring that risk of injury from driving over hose stretched
across street “unforeseeable”).
123
Some modern forms of judicial cost-benefit analysis conclude that a whole range of
precautions by the defendant were not socially worthwhile. See, e.g., Vasilenko v. Grace
Family Church, 404 P.3d 1196, 1201–02 (Cal. 2017) (determining that landowner’s costbenefical precautions to prevent injury from invitees crossing a street from parking lot are
limited and unproductive relative to their costs).
124
See Zachlod v. Seymour Beacon Falls, LLC, No. AANCV156019053S, 2017 WL 6997255,
at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2017) (holding that defendant was entitled to summary
judgment when plaintiff submitted no substantial evidence of floor defect upon which she
allegedly slipped or defendant’s untaken precaution); Morgan v. Nickowski, No. 334668,
2017 WL 5759789, at *7 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2017) (holding that defendant landlord was
entitled to summary judgment when plaintiff submitted no evidence that he knew his
tenants owned pit bulls that hurt plaintiff’s dog).
125
See Rogers v. Santoro-Cotton, No. 1-17-0606, 2018 IL App. (1st) 170606-U, at *4 (Ill. App.
Ct. Jan. 18, 2018) (holding that defendant was entitled to summary judgment because
plaintiff failed to identify any potentially negligent untaken precaution that was cause of
plaintiff’s injury); Psillas v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 66 S.W.3d 860, 863, 866 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2001) (ruling that defendant was entitled to summary judgment when plaintiffs failed
unreasonably to identify the object that cut their son and what, if anything, the defendant
could have done to prevent the accident when the immediate cause was older sister rocking
the boy on a roll of carpeting offered for sale); Czarnecki v. Hagenow, 477 N.E.2d 964, 968
(Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (ordering that summary judgment was proper for defendant because
plaintiff failed to identify defendant’s untaken precaution).
126
See Rosen v. Bronx Hosp., 127 N.E.2d 82, 82 (N.Y. 1955) (finding judgment as matter of
law for defendant when plaintiff stuck his fingers into hinge area of closing door); Armstrong
v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 788 N.E.2d 1088, 1092 (Ohio 2003) (holding that defendant retailer was
entitled to summary judgment because bracket for store shopping-cart guardrail upon which
plaintiff tripped was open and obvious).
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The traditional rule was that an invitor’s liability to an invitee depended
on the hazard being nonobvious. 127 Usually cases finding judgment as a
matter of law for the defendant on this ground involve small risks for
which the efficient prevention is for the plaintiff to notice and avoid them.
Another class of cases entails situations where the plaintiff voluntarily
encountered a substantial and obvious risk out of recklessness.
5.

The Undisputed Facts on the Judgment Record Showed that the
Defendant Used All Cost-Beneficial Precautions

It was proper to enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of a
dangerous nightclub whose security personnel and uniformed law
enforcement personnel, in a two-step process, patted down all customers
for concealed weapons but failed to notice the weapon the plaintiff’s
assailant was carrying.128 The court did not stress cost-benefit analysis but
rather the substantiality of the elaborate and costly precautions that the
defendant used.129 The court’s decision suggested that a defendant who
establishes an elaborate and costly precaution plan should not be held
liable for every lapse in it. A contrary rule would punish investments in
safety.
Often a court’s conclusion that the defendant used cost-beneficial
precaution follows from its judgment that the defendant lacked actual or
constructive knowledge of the risk. 130 These cases are basically the same
as those entering judgment as a matter of law for the defendant on the
ground that the risk was unforeseeable.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his
invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the
exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees,
and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger,
or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise
reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). Subparagraph (b) is the
“obviousness” requirement, which denies liability to an invitee for an “obvious” defect in
the defendant’s land.
128
See Yearwood v. Club Miami, Inc., 728 S.E.2d 790, 790–91 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
129
Id. at 791–92.
130
See, e.g., De Leon v. AvalonBay Cmtys., Inc., No. B272008, 2018 WL 416539, at *3 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2018) (concluding summary judgment for defendant was proper because
gas company had fixed gas leak a month before plaintiff became dizzy and fell on
defendant’s steps). Compare Gordon v. Am. Museum of History, 492 N.E.2d 774, 775 (N.Y.
1986) (finding that waxed paper on which plaintiff slipped was fresh, suggesting that
defendant was patrolling steps reasonably), with Anjou v. Bos. Elevated Ry., 94 N.E. 386, 386
(Mass. 1911) (finding that banana peel upon which plaintiff slipped was blackened and
gritty, suggesting that defendant was negligently patrolling its platform).
127
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Expert Evidence was Required to Show Breach of Duty and was
Absent on Record

Beyond cost-benefit analysis, another common reason for granting
summary judgment to a defendant is when the plaintiff’s claim requires
expert testimony on the standard of care and that testimony is absent or
inadequate.131
7.

The Defendant’s Act was Involuntary

Another ground for summary judgment for a party is that his or her
act was involuntary. These cases entail situations in which the relevant
party was not able to use reasonable precaution. 132
B. A Correlative Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis
When an appellate court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a plaintiff’s verdict, the question can be the same as under a
defense motion for summary judgment—namely, was the defendant
entitled to judgment as a matter of law? Sometimes courts will use costbenefit analysis in this setting to assure themselves that the burden of
some untaken precaution was less than its reduction in risk. 133 When the
appellate court finds that no untaken precaution proved at trial had a
burden less than its benefit, the court will reverse the plaintiff’s

See, e.g., Bondy v. Allen, 635 N.W.2d 244, 249, 251 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding
summary judgment for defendant was proper because plaintiff’s claim for aggravated harm
against ambulance company required expert testimony, and expert testimony provided was
inadequate); Upson Cty. Hosp., Inc. v. Head, 540 S.E.2d 626, 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (ruling
that summary judgment for hospital was proper when plaintiff failed to file timely expert
affidavit on standard of care in medical malpractice case).
132
See, e.g., Ballew v. Aiello, 422 S.W.2d 396, 397–400 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967) (granting
summary judgment for defendant who grabbed steering wheel when not fully awake);
Alexander v. Allen, 538 So. 2d 1372, 1373 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (ruling that defendant was
properly awarded summary judgment when she screamed in response to robber’s demand,
precipitating shooting of defendant’s licensee in backyard). Cf. Lobert v. Pack, 9 A.2d 365,
368 (Pa. 1939) (holding evidence sufficient to support defendant’s verdict and new trial was
unwarranted when defendant kicked backseat of car while asleep, precipitating accident).
133
See Davis v. Consol. Rail Corp., 788 F.2d 1260, 1268 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (holding
that blowing the train’s horn plausibly would have reduced risk more than the burden of
this precaution, so enough evidence existed to support jury’s liability verdict); Fuentes v.
Consol. Rail Corp., 789 F. Supp. 638, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding it is plausible that stopping
the train sooner would have reduced risk more than the burden of this precaution so there
was enough evidence to support jury’s liability verdict); Sw. Telegraph & Telephone Co. v.
Abeles, 126 S.W. 724, 726 (Ark. 1910) (holding that it is plausible that grounding surge
protector would have reduced the risk of loud noises more than its burden).
131
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judgment.134 Again, just as before, the purpose is to set a ceiling on the
precautionary requirements created by juries.
V. WHEN CAN COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS BE A CEILING ON PRECAUTION
REQUIREMENTS?
Cost-benefit analysis can establish a ceiling for precaution
requirements only when the untaken precaution alleged as the breach is
susceptible to the analysis. Some have argued that this point relates to the
impossibility of measuring the value of human life, but instead it more
fundamentally concerns the difficulty of seeing whether an actor was
adopting an efficient rate of very common precautions that must be used
repeatedly. When a surgical team leaves a sponge in a patient or a
pharmacist misdispenses a drug, it does not necessarily follow that either
has behaved inconsistently with cost-benefit analysis. NASA rockets
crash because of human errors even when millions of dollars have been
spent to avoid those errors. The same can be true, on a smaller scale, in
the operating room and the pharmacy. Let us look first at the difficulties
of evaluating human life and limb and then take up the more serious and
informative question of which types of precautions are subject to reliable
cost-benefit analysis and which are not.
A. The Inevitability of Valuations of Human Life and Limb
Cost-benefit analysis can be used to prevent or annul jury verdicts
only when cost-benefit analysis can be sensibly used to assess the
reasonableness of an untaken precaution. Some Kantians believe that
cost-benefit analysis is inapposite when human life or serious human
injury is at stake.135 Even this concession may be inconsistent with Kant’s
ideas because practically all cost-benefit analysis is a justification for
treating the victim of affirmative conduct as a “means” toward the actor’s
ends. Nevertheless, in the age of technology, when we often act in ways
that could imperil human life or human flourishing, we inevitably place a
value on life. A stroll through Königsberg may not place a value on
human life or limb, but a drive down the freeway does. If a person
routinely drives seventy-five miles per hour on freeways and an actuary
knew from government data the fatality rate from this practice versus the
fatality rate from driving at a reasonable or lawful speed and could also
Indeed, we have already mentioned these cases. See, e.g., Adams v. Bullock, 125 N.E.
93, 93–94 (N.Y. 1919) (Cardozo, J.) (holding that plaintiff’s verdict must be reversed because
plaintiff failed to prove cost-beneficial precaution).
135
Cf. Gregory C. Keating, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis the Only Game in Town?, 91 S. CAL. REV.
195, 207 (2018) (noting that Kant described humans as “above all price”).
134
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estimate how much value the person places on traveling at the higher
speed, then the actuary could estimate the value that person places on
human life. It is a simple algebraic calculation. Anyone who engages in
any risky activity is implicitly placing a value on human life. When courts
use cost-benefit analysis, they are not introducing any new idea but
simply evaluating whether private valuations of human life are
reasonable.
Let us turn now to the real problem with cost-benefit analysis in the
context of negligence law. This problem requires a relatively simple
taxonomy of potentially untaken precautions.
B. A Simple Taxonomy of Precautions
1.

Durable and Nondurable Precautions

A “durable precaution” is basically capital. It is an asset that is
purchased once (or infrequently) and yields a stream of safety benefits
over time. A “durable precaution” is also a precaution that a defendant
need not use repetitively because a single investment in it lasts for a long
time. Examples are fire escapes, fences, life jackets, and so forth. By
contrast, a “nondurable precaution” is basically labor. Such a precaution
must normally be used repetitively. Nondurable precautions are usually
complements to durable precautions. A fire escape will need to be
periodically inspected and serviced to make sure that the last springloaded part of it still extends to the ground when a person steps on it; a
fence must be periodically checked for holes; life jackets must be checked
to see whether they are still on the boat. Nevertheless, nondurable
precautions can occasionally be substitutes for durable precautions or
productively independent of them. For instance, manually checking one’s
blind spot before changing lanes is a substitute for having a device that
automatically checks the driver’s blind spot; checking whether a boat’s
deck has any slippery places on it is a precaution that can be productive
independently of whether the life jackets are still on the boat; having
bright-colored strings on surgical sponges can reduce the marginal
productivity of keeping an accurate count of them and thus is a precaution
that substitutes for an accurate count. Just as capital and labor are used
together to produce physical products, durable precaution and
nondurable precaution are used together to produce safety.
2.

Precaution Plans

It is also useful to distinguish between precautions and precaution
plans. Courts typically bring a different analysis to faulty precaution
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plans as compared to individual lapses in implementing a good plan. For
instance, suppose a good plan is to count the sponges when placed into
the patient, and then again before the patient is closed, to see whether the
results tally. If a surgeon lacked this plan and never counted the sponges,
it would lead to a conclusion of breach of duty under an objective
analysis—the Learned Hand formula or some approximation of it. 136 If,
on the other hand, a surgeon possessed this plan but simply failed on one
occasion to notice that the number of sponges placed into the patient
exceeded the number retrieved, it would lead to a more subjective analysis
of breach of duty.
Theoretically, one could have a plan for both durable and nondurable
precautions. One plan might be to replace your tires whenever they
appear worn, and another plan might be to check your blind spot every
time before you change lanes. As a practical matter, plans to use
nondurable precautions are more salient in negligence cases.
3.

Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Nondurable Precautions

We can also distinguish between “homogeneous” and
“heterogeneous” nondurable precautions. If we posit some plan to use
nondurable precaution repeatedly, such as to count the surgical sponges
or to maintain a reasonable speed when driving, we can distinguish two
different types of iterations:
homogeneous and heterogeneous.
Homogeneous iterations/precautions are uniform, and heterogeneous
iterations/precautions are different in the sense that their required quality
differs according to the variable amount of foreseeable risk avoided by
each iteration and its cost. Lapses in either kind of nondurable precaution
will be called “compliance errors.”
C. How Does the Taxonomy Aid Our Understanding of Negligence Practice?
As we will soon see, U.S. courts allow juries to forgive all varieties of
untaken precautions—durable, nondurable, homogeneous, and
heterogeneous. Jury forgiveness is not allowed only in the rare instances
in which courts find negligence as a matter of law. As previously
mentioned, these judgments as a matter of law for plaintiffs—in jury-

Judgments of breach of duty as a matter of law are very rare, but for a surgeon to adopt
the plan never to count sponges, or ask anyone in the operating room to count sponges for
him, would be an extremely dangerous plan that might well lead to liability as a matter of
law. See Kesewaa v. Key Food Supermarket, 836 N.Y.S.2d 486, 486–87 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 16,
2006) (holding that negligence as a matter of law applies to a store putting shopping carts on
top of a food freezer to which customers had frequent access).

136
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eligible cases—are largely idiosyncratic across jurisdictions.137 The main
area of inconsistent practice is the violation of selected statutes in some
jurisdictions. Nevertheless, a more general bar on jury forgiveness also
exists, though the cases are so rare that it is difficult at this point to
establish its importance. These are willful and wanton failures to use costbeneficial durable precautions and precaution plans. In addition, some
jurisdictions have begun to bar some impositions of liability for
nondurable precautions under the rubric of “no duty.” We will soon
explore both legal themes.
The more significant implication of the taxonomy is that courts hardly
ever limit impositions of liability for lapses in homogeneous nondurable
precaution. Effectively, this means that courts allow juries to impose
liability for some efficient lapses in nondurable precaution. This latter
point is the key to much of the complexity of negligence doctrine. If only
inefficient lapses were punished by the negligence system, there would be
much less need for many of the judge-created limitations on negligence
liability, including in the areas of duty, cause in fact, and proximate cause.
As a prelude to the subsequent analysis, we briefly explore how
broadly allowable jury forgiveness extends over the various categories of
untaken precautions. Juries can forgive almost all breaches of duty.
Nevertheless, juries cannot require inefficient precaution except, mainly,
in the area of nondurable precaution.
D. “The Quality of Mercy Is Not Strain’d”
1.

Faulty or Omitted Durable Precautions

A jury was allowed to forgive the absence of highly productive antislip floor runners in a grocery store produce section even when the store’s
own safety standards required them and when store employees were
conducting only the most sporadic inspections.138 A jury was permitted
to forgive a restaurant for maintaining a dangerously slippery and
unlighted entrance.139 Nevertheless, in highly similar cases, juries were
also allowed to find defendants liable for the absence of durable
precautions.140
See supra Part III.B.
See Malaney v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 861 A.2d 1069, 1077–78 (Vt. 2004) (holding that the
“question for the jury was simply whether defendant had taken reasonable steps to protect
its customers, including plaintiff, from that foreseable hazard”).
139
Stanford v. Bailey, Inc., 282 P.2d 992, 996–97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (holding that jury was
allowed to forgive dangerous entryway to café where plaintiff slipped and fell).
140
See, e.g., Poloski v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 68 S.W.3d 445, 448 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that jury was permitted to find defendant retailer jointly liable with a distracted
seventy-nine-year-old driver when, next to the front of the store, the driver ran over the
137
138
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Faulty or Omitted Precaution Plans

A jury was allowed to forgive landlords who failed to comply with a
regulatory procedure to abate lead that, because of the noncompliance, led
to the injury of the plaintiff’s infant son.141 This was a New York case that
did not entail New York’s doctrine of negligence per se because the statute
was not a traffic or labor code provision. 142 Similarly, juries have been
allowed to forgive a faulty plan to care for an elder143 and an omitted plan
to monitor a hypertensive patient’s blood pressure.144 A jury would be
permitted to forgive a faulty plan of taking an inebriated young person to
the side of a cliff from which he fell. 145
3.

Faulty or Omitted Heterogeneous Nondurable Precautions

A jury was allowed to forgive a large retailer’s faulty repair of a
dangerous riding lawn mower that, after the supposed repair, burned the
plaintiff’s foot so badly that it ultimately became infected with gangrene,
plaintiffs’ decedent; plaintiffs relied on the store’s failure to design the parking lot so as to
reduce traffic in front of the store, absence of speed bumps, absence of crossing guards,
absence of marked crosswalks, and so forth); Nin v. Bernard, 683 N.Y.S.2d 237, 238 (App.
Div. 1999) (holding that jury was permitted to find that small depression in walkway was
negligent); Barber v. Presbyterian Hosp., 555 S.E.2d 303, 308 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (jury
permitted to find defendant liable for plaintiff’s fall down unmarked “step-down” directly
inside defendant’s coffee shop door); Anderson v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc., 740 N.E.2d 819,
828–29 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (jury permitted to find drainage ditch adjacent to runway was
negligently placed).
141
See Vega v. Molina, 658 N.Y.S.2d 387, 400 (App. Div. 1997).
142
Compare Gonzalez v. Bishop, 68 N.Y.S.3d 454, 455–56 (App. Div. 2018) (holding that
defendant, who failed to yield statutory right-of-way to through traffic, liable as a matter of
law despite plaintiff's assertion the defendant was speeding, which court said was
"speculative"), with Burns v. Marcellus Lanes, Inc., 92 N.Y.S.3d 824, 2019 WL 409216, at *1–2
(App. Div. Feb. 1, 2019) (holding that plaintiff worker who fell from backhoe bucket while
cleaning snow and ice off roof was prima facie entitled to judgment as a matter of law under
New York scaffold law).
143
See Lane v. Emeritus Corp., 855 N.W.2d 201, 2014 WL 3749425, at *5–6 (Iowa Ct. App.
July 30, 2014) (unpublished table decision) (holding that jury was allowed to forgive
defendant nursing home's clearly faulty plan to care for plaintiff's decedent).
144
See Terajima v. Torrance Memorial Med. Ctr., No. B195298, 2008 WL 192650, at *5 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2008) (jury allowed to forgive defendants for their faulty plan of failing to
monitor plaintiff's blood pressure). But see Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974)
(holding defendant ophthalmologist negligent as a matter of law for failing to administer
glaucoma test to plaintiff when such test was supposedly uncustomary for patients under
forty years old).
145
See Carlsen v. Koivumaki, 174 Cal. Rptr. 3d 339, 354 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding that jury
would be allowed to forgive defendants for faulty precaution plan of taking inebriated
plaintiff to edge of cliff from which he fell). But see Keenan v. Smith, 197 Cal. Rptr. 32, 32 (Ct.
App. 1983) (holding defendant landowner negligent as a matter of law for adopting plan not
to cut down rotten tree).
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which led to the amputation of both her foot and part of her leg. 146 A jury
was allowed to forgive a home renter who probably failed to use
reasonable precaution in escaping from a locked sunroom. 147
4.

Omitted Homogeneous Nondurable Precautions

Juries have been allowed to forgive motorists who have rear-ended
cars stopped ahead of them even when the motorists have offered no
excuse or justification for their lapses. 148 Juries have been allowed to
forgive motorists who have struck pedestrians who were walking in the
proper zone.149 Juries may forgive surgeons who have failed to retrieve
See Anderson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 664 S.E.2d 911, 915 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). But see
Previs v. Dailey, 180 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Ky. 2005) (jury tried to absolve truck driver who failed
to ensure that he had fully passed bicyclist before swinging back into her space, but court
reversed and found driver negligent as a matter of law).
147
See Tyburski v. Stewart, 694 S.E.2d 422, 427 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010). Under the strict rule
of contributory negligence that barred a plaintiff’s recovery, courts often allowed juries to
forgive plaintiffs for their negligence. See, e.g., Granath v. Andrus, 160 P.2d 129 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1945). The plaintiff in Granath made a mistake in judging the speed and distance of the
defendant's trailer truck and collided with it; the defendant conceded that it was negligent
operation of the truck, but the jury found for the plaintiff, and this judgment was affirmed
because "every mistake of judgment is not negligence, for mistakes are made even in the
exercise of ordinary care," and "[t]he circumstances under which a court can declare that
certain acts constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law are rare." Id. at 130–31. See
also Couchman v. Snelling, 295 P. 845, 846–47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931). In Couchman, as plaintiff
was trying to the cross street, he misjudged the closing rate of defendant's auto with the
right-of-way, and a collision ensued. Id. The jury forgave plaintiff’s alleged contributory
negligence, which was affirmed on appeal because "[t]he circumstances under which a court
can declare that certain acts constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law are rare."
Id. at 847.
148
See, e.g., Melgen v. Suarez, 951 So. 2d 916, 917 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Garcia v.
Leftwich-Kitchen, 412 S.W.3d 348, 351–52 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); Williams v. Thompson, 489
S.W.3d 823, 826, 828 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (holding the jury was allowed to forgive defendant
for rear-end collision when she testified it was raining); Giles v. Riverside Transp., Inc., 266
S.W.3d 290, 294 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); Capshaw v. Gulf Ins. Co., 107 P.3d 595, 604 (Okla. 2005)
(holding that jury was allowed to forgive driver, who without apparent excuse or
justification rear-ended plaintiff's vehicle, and reversed trial court's order for new trial); Hurt
v. Chavis, 739 A.2d 924, 932 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (stating that the jury has power to find
no liability in a rear-end collision even when defendant has offered no excuse or
justification); Stone v. Sulak, 994 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. App. 1999) (concluding that the jury
was allowed to forgive motorist who, without excuse or justification, rear-ended another
vehicle; opinion collects other similar Texas cases). But see Guckian v. Fowler, 453 S.W.2d
323, 326 (Tex. App. 1970) (jury attempted to forgive motorist who rear-ended another car,
but trial court entered judgment n.o.v. for plaintiff on issue of liability, and appellate court
affirmed).
149
See, e.g., Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 62, 1835 WL 1732, at *4–5 (Vt. 1835) (holding that
jury was allowed to forgive defendant who was driving his horse and sulky fast and ran
down plaintiff, a pedestrian, who was walking in the pedestrian area); Kukuchka v. Ziemet,
710 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Mont. 1985) (holding that jury was allowed to forgive motorist who
146
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surgical instruments from their patients before closing them. 150 Similarly,
juries are often permitted to forgive pharmacists for dispensing the wrong
drug or the wrong dosage from what was prescribed. 151
A jury was allowed to forgive a wholesale bakery that baked and sold
a brownie containing a dangerous knife blade that hurt the plaintiff’s
throat.152 Another jury was allowed to forgive a teacher who, without
excuse or justification, lost her grip on a piñata bat and struck the plaintiff,
her first-grade student.153

struck pedestrian from the rear on a dark night). See also Spriesterbach v. Holland, 155 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 306, 313, 320 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding that jury was allowed to forgive motorist who
struck bicyclist possessing right-of-way because "every mistake of judgment is not
negligence, for mistakes are made even in the exercise of ordinary care, and whether such
mistakes of judgment constitute negligence, is a question of fact").
150
See, e.g., Houserman v. Garrett, 902 So. 2d 670, 675 (Ala. 2004) (holding that a foreign
object left in a patient creates only prima facie showing of a surgeon’s negligence that will
allow jury to forgive the surgeon in a proper case), rev’g Ravi v. Williams, 536 So. 2d 1374,
1377 (Ala. 1988). Houserman held it proper to instruct the jury that to impute negligence it
only had to find that defendant surgeon left the sponge inside the plaintiff and that she
suffered damage from it. See also Deuel v. Surgical Clinic, PLLC, No. M2009-01551-COA-R3CV, 2010 WL 3237297, at *17 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2010). In Deuel, a defendant surgeon
left a lap sponge in a patient during pancreatic surgery. Id. at *1–3. The parties cross-moved
for summary judgment, the court denied both motions, and the court of appeals affirmed,
making it clear that the jury possessed the power to either acquit the surgeon or not. Id. at
*2; Estate of Deuel v. Surgical Clinic, PLLC, No. M2011-02610-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL
11021322, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2013) (in remanded case, jury did indeed forgive
surgeon, and appellate court held that jury was properly instructed and again stressed that
the jury possessed the power to acquit the surgeon). See also Warner v. Stewart, No. F037392,
2002 WL 1970072, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2002) (holding jury was allowed to forgive
surgeon who left retractor in plaintiff). In Chi Yun Ho v. Frye, the defendant surgeon left a
lap sponge in the plaintiff during a hysterectomy. Chi Yun Ho v. Frye, 865 N.E.2d 632, 633–
34, 638–39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The jury found for defendant, and the intermediate appellate
court entered judgment as a matter of law for the patient on the ground that the surgeon said
only that he relied entirely on the nurse’s count of pads. Id. at 638–39, rev’d, Chi Yun Ho v.
Frye, 880 N.E.2d 1192, 1198–99 (Ind. 2008) (remanding the cause for a new trial on ground
that jury possessed power to acquit surgeon of any negligence).
151
See, e.g., Cackowski v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 So. 2d 319, 322 (Ala. 2000) (allowing
jury to forgive pharmacy for misfill); Watkins v. Potts, 122 So. 416, 418 (Ala. 1929) (finding
the jury was allowed to forgive pharmacist's misfill); Ohio Cty. Drug Co. v. Howard, 256
S.W. 705, 706 (Ky. 1923) (stating that pharmacist is not “insurer” of accuracy of his
dispensing, and question of his negligence is for jury), rev’g Fleet & Semple v. Hollenkemp,
13 B. Mon. 219, 1852 WL 1716, at *7–8 (Ky. 1852). See also Harris v. Groth, 645 P.2d 1104, 1107
(Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that jury was allowed to forgive pharmacist dispensing error
supported by evidence that it caused harm even after trial court had instructed the same jury
that dispensing error was negligence as a matter of law).
152
See McDermott v. Coffee Beanery, Ltd., 777 N.Y.S.2d 103, 112–13 (App. Div. 2004).
153
See A.C. ex rel. Cooper v. Bellingham Sch. Dist., 105 P.3d 400, 410–11 (Wash. Ct. App.
2005).
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VI. WHAT NEGLIGENT CONDUCT CAN JURIES NOT FORGIVE?
There is little uniformity across the U.S. on what types of negligence
juries cannot forgive. As already noted, judgments of negligence liability
as a matter of law are much rarer than judgments of no liability as a matter
of law.154 Still, it is possible to generalize on this subject.
A. When a Party Engaged in Deliberate Gross Negligence
Suppose the evidence indicates that a defendant has deliberately
acted, or not acted, so as to create a large amount of risk to others. In the
language of the law, such a defendant has “willfully and wantonly”
engaged in “gross negligence.”155 This is the type of conduct that often
yields punitive as well as actual damages. Consistently, the courts often
find such defendants “negligent as a matter of law” and thus prevent any
possibility of jury forgiveness. These cases are uncommon in the case
reports, probably because they often settle for full damages.
Here are two examples. In Kesewaa v. Key Food Supermarket,156 the
defendant had stored heavy, wheeled shopping carts on top of a freezer
from which its customers retrieved food products. When the predictable
occurred and a cart toppled onto the plaintiff, she sued. The court found
the defendant negligent as matter of law.157 The defendant had
deliberately engaged in gross negligence. Similarly, in Newing v.
Cheatham,158 a civil aviation pilot failed to check his fuel gauge for several
See, e.g., Morejon v. Rais Constr. Co., 851 N.E.2d 1143, 1146 (N.Y. 2006) (explaining that
liability as a matter of law cases are rare under res ipsa theory).
155
See Patrick H. Martin, The BP Spill and the Meaning of “Gross Negligence or Willful
Misconduct,” 71 LA. L. REV. 957, 967 (2011) (defining gross negligence).
156
See Kesewaa v. Key Food Supermarket, 836 N.Y.S.2d 486, 2006 WL 3772314, at *2 (Sup.
Ct. Aug. 16, 2006) (unpublished table decision). See also American Airlines, Inc. v. Ulen, 186
F.2d 529, 533–34 (D.C. Cir. 1949). In American Airlines v. Ulen, the court found the defendant
negligent as a matter of law for adopting a flight plan in which its airliner would cross a
3910-foot mountain at 4000 feet when FAA regulations required at least 1000 feet of
clearance, and the aircraft struck a mountain, injuring the plaintiff. Id. at 530–31. The court
found liability as a matter of law existed notwithstanding the Warsaw Convention because
defendant was guilty of "wilful misconduct." Id. at 533–34. See also Deep River Assocs.,
L.L.C. v. McCann, No. MMXCV156013881, 2016 WL 1397582, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 15,
2016) (finding defendants, owners and operators of long-time dry-cleaning business, were
guilty of negligence per se and personally liable to property purchasers for violating
environmental statutes by dumping a dangerous chemical that plaintiffs had to remediate);
Jacobs v. Westgate, 766 So. 2d 1175, 1180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam) (holding the
defendant negligent as a matter of law for removing plaintiff's possessions onto curb were
they were stolen and ruined by rain).
157
See Kesewaa v. Key Food Supermarket, 836 N.Y.S.2d 486, 2006 WL 3772314, at *2 (Sup.
Ct. 2004).
158
See Newing v. Cheatham, 540 P.2d 33, 36 (Cal. 1975).
154
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hours. When the plane ran out of fuel it crashed, killing all aboard. A
passenger’s survivor sued the pilot’s estate. There was also evidence that
the pilot had stopped at a bar and drank beer the morning of the flight,
and empty beer cans were strewn around the crash site. The investigators
testified that the pilot’s body smelled of alcohol but that the plaintiff’s
decedent’s body did not.159 The trial court entered judgment as a matter
of law for the plaintiff, which was affirmed. 160 Again, the defendant had
deliberately engaged in gross negligence.
Corresponding cases show that a plaintiff’s deliberate act of gross
negligence will often bar his or her recovery as a matter of law. 161
B. When Jury Bias Was Probable
Courts will often find negligence as a matter of law when, despite the
plaintiff presenting a strong case, the jury acquits the defendant, and it
seems probable that the jury was biased either against the plaintiff or in
favor of the defendant. A good example is Huetter v. Andrews.162 That case
involved an auto accident that occurred right after World War II when the
defendant, who was twenty-two years old, had just been discharged from
the Marine Corps. Failing to notice over a long period of time that the
plaintiff’s car was crossing the highway ahead of him, 163 the recently
discharged Marine did not slow or brake his vehicle but ran directly into
the plaintiff’s car. At the trial, both the defendant and his lawyer
conspicuously wore their Marine Corps discharge buttons, and the trial
court also allowed the defendant’s war record to be admitted into
evidence.164 The plaintiff was an elderly woman. The jury returned a
verdict for the defendant, and the trial court entered judgment on it. 165
Id. at 38.
Id. at 44.
161
See, e.g., Proffitt v. Gosnell, 809 S.E.2d 200, 213 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) (finding
contributory negligence as a matter of law after plaintiff stood on top of a tree that had fallen
across the road until a car struck him); Quiktrip Corp. v. Fesenko, 491 S.E.2d 504, 505–06 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1997) (finding contributory negligence as a matter of law when plaintiff stood for
three to five minutes in a stream of gasoline from an allegedly malfunctioning retail pump);
Horn v. Oh, 195 Cal. Rptr. 720, 724 (Ct. App. 1983) (after plaintiff's apparent settlement with
other defendants involved in dangerous and reckless pickup-truck-pushing venture that
hurt plaintiff bystander, jury attempted to absolve defendant who went to trial and who was
gratuitous volunteer in venture, but court held jury could not forgive him and that this
volunteer was negligent as a matter of law).
162
See Huetter v. Andrews, 204 P.2d 655 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949).
163
Id. at 656–57. The plaintiff’s son, who was driving, began to cross the highway when it
was safe to do so but traveled very slowly. Id. The road was straight, the weather good, and
the defendant’s forward view was unobstructed over the long period of time in which he
was approaching the plaintiff’s car. Id.
164
Id. at 657.
165
Id.
159
160
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The appellate court reversed, holding that the defendant had been
negligent as a matter of law and stressed that the jury may have been
improperly sympathetic to the defendant. 166
C. Idiosyncratic Statutory Violations
The main arena for negligence as a matter of law is compliance errors
that also amount to traffic or labor code violations. New York possesses
an especially rich jurisprudence of these cases dating from the famous
Cardozo opinion in Martin v. Herzog.167 In Smith v. Omanes,168 the plaintiff
assumed that the defendant would stop at a stop sign, but he instead ran
the stop sign and collided with her. The court upheld partial summary
judgment for the plaintiff on the issue of liability, stressing that the
defendant had violated the state’s vehicle code and that the plaintiff
possessed the statutory right-of-way.169 This is the standard result
reached by New York courts in these cases so long as the plaintiff can
show that she was free of comparative negligence, as in Smith v. Omanes,
when plaintiff was entitled to assume that the defendant would obey the
statute and had only seconds to react to his violation of it. Nevertheless,
the picture is far from simple. Even in New York, many statutory
violations, even traffic and labor code violations, yield upheld defense
verdicts.170

Id. at 658. Ayala v. Lee was a similar case. Ayala v. Lee, 81 A.3d 584, 587–88 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2013). During a severe rainstorm, the plaintiffs were parked on a highway
shoulder, fixing a windshield wiper, when their car was struck by the defendant, who
violated traffic laws by being off lane and not keeping a good lookout. Id. The plaintiffs
were undocumented immigrants who were suing, inter alia, for lost wages. Id. at 588. The
jury tried to acquit the defendant, but the appellate court found the defendant negligent as a
matter of law and remanded for a trial on damages with detailed instructions on how
plaintiffs’ undocumented status should be handled. Id. at 599.
167
See Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 820 (N.Y. 1920) (concluding that plaintiff was
contributorily negligent as a matter of law for violating a statute requiring his buggy to show
a light after dark).
168
See Smith v. Omanes, 998 N.Y.S.2d 198, 198 (App. Div. 2014).
169
See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1142(a) (McKinney, Westlaw through 2018).
170
Even in New York, when two defendants have each committed traffic violations, the
jury can forgive one of them on proximate cause grounds. See Gibson v. Singh Towing, Inc.,
155 A.D.3d 614, 616 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017); Pierre v. Andre, 151 A.D.3d 1089, 1090 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2017); Kohler v. Barker, 147 A.D.3d 1037, 1037–38 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). In New York,
defendant who rear-ended plaintiff’s vehicle and pleaded guilty to a traffic violation of
traveling too closely could still be forgiven on evidence that the truck in front of plaintiff’s
vehicle stopped suddenly. Jones v. Egan, 585 A.D.2d 909, 912 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). The
strict New York rule may be changing. In Zhubrak v. Petro, a New York jury was allowed to
forgive the defendant’s apparent traffic violation in failing to yield the right-of-way.
Zhubrak v. Petro, 48 N.Y.S.3d 704, 705–06 (App. Div. 2017), aff'g 998 N.Y.S.2d 85 (App. Div.
2014) (holding that a new trial was proper, as opposed to judgment as a matter of law for
166
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California and other states allow juries to forgive even statutory
violations. In Minnegren v. Nozar,171 the plaintiff again had the statutory
right-of-way when the defendant ran a stop sign and collided with her.
Two independent witnesses testified that the defendant ran the stop sign
and even accelerated through the intersection. 172 The defendant himself
admitted on the stand that he caused the collision, but not “intentionally,”
and that he was “only human” and “made a mistake.” 173 The
investigating officer found that the collision was caused by his failing to
yield at the stop sign, that the defendant was the “the party at fault,” and
that a contributing cause was the defendant’s speed in running the stop
sign.174 The Los Angeles jury found for the defendant. 175 The plaintiff
appealed on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, that the evidence
showed that the accident was caused by the defendant’s negligence as a
matter of law.176 The California Court of Appeals instead affirmed the
defense verdict and stressed that “not every mistake equates to
negligence” and that it was the jury’s role to determine whether this
mistake should yield liability or not. 177 In California and many states,
juries can forgive compliance errors, even compliance errors that violate
traffic statutes designed to protect the type of plaintiff who sued. 178
A notable exception to California’s policy of requiring all compliance
error cases to be tried to juries is violations of its crosswalk statutes. In
Gray v. Brinkerhoff,179 the defendant was turning his pickup truck left
across a crosswalk and struck the plaintiff carrying groceries in the middle
of a crosswalk. The jury found the plaintiff contributorily negligent

plaintiff, when jury forgave defendant for striking plaintiff's car in intersection from stopsign-controlled side street).
171
See Minnegren v. Nozar, 208 Cal. Rptr. 3d 655, 658 (Ct. App. 2016).
172
Id.
173
Id. at 660.
174
Id. at 659.
175
Id. at 660.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 664.
178
See, e.g., Spriesterbach v. Holland, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 306, 321 (Ct. App. 2013) (defendant,
without statutory right-of-way, ran directly into bicyclist with right-of-way; after the
accident, plaintiff rudely complained to defendant; defense jury verdict was affirmed even
with concededly erroneous instructions unfavorable to plaintiff, determined by appellate
court to be “harmless error”); Safirstein v. Nunes, 50 Cal. Rptr. 642, 642 (Ct. App. 1966) (car
without statutory right-of-way ran directly into car in which plaintiff was passenger; defense
verdict affirmed). California courts often stress that “mistakes are made even in the exercise
of ordinary care” and even with respect to statutory duties. See De Priest v. City of Glendale,
169 P.2d. 17, 21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946). This doctrine seems to have arisen as a means of
forgiving the plaintiff’s contributory negligence. Id. (“[M]istakes are made even in the
exercise of ordinary care.”). This doctrine is now applied to primary negligence.
179
See Gray v. Brinkerhoff, 258 P.2d 834, 835 (Cal. 1953).
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though there was little evidence to support that finding. The California
Supreme Court found not only that the evidence was insufficient to show
contributory negligence (in other words, that the plaintiff was not liable
as a matter of law) but also that the defendant was negligent as a matter
of law.180 It seems from the opinion that the court’s main concern was to
limit jury findings of contributory negligence, but a corollary of that wish
was to find the defendant negligent as a matter of law in this case. The
defendant had offered two excuses for hitting the plaintiff: (1) that his
attention was diverted by a fast-approaching car; and (2) that his vision of
the plaintiff was obscured by the front part of his truck.181 The court found
both excuses legally insufficient and stressed that the plaintiff possessed
the statutory right-of-way.182
Gray v. Brinkerhoff was immediately limited by Callahan v. Gray,183 a
case in which the plaintiff walked into the defendant’s car, which was
stopped in a crosswalk. In addition, there was no evidence of damages.
The court affirmed the jury verdict for the defendant. 184 Subsequent
California crosswalk collision cases entail a mixture of liability as a matter
of law185 and deference to the jury verdict. 186 Nevertheless, holdings of

Id. at 836.
Id.
182
Id. (“‘The driver of a vehicle shall yield the right of way to a pedestrian crossing the
roadway within any marked crosswalk . . . .’ It is undisputed that defendant did not yield
the right of way to plaintiff. Such failure constitutes a violation of the statute and negligence
as a matter of law in the absence of reasonable explanation for defendant’s conduct.”).
183
See Callahan v. Gray, 279 P.2d 963, 965 (Cal. 1955).
184
See id. (holding that evidence supported jury finding that plaintiff negligently walked
into the side of defendant’s car).
185
See Novak v. Dewar, 361 P.2d 709, 711 (Cal. 1961) (finding the defendant negligent as a
matter of law and plaintiff nonnegligent as a matter of law). See also La Manna v. Stewart,
530 P.2d 1073, 1083 (Cal. 1975) (concluding that defendant motorist was negligent as a matter
of law); Schmitt v. Henderson, 462 P.2d 30, 34 (Cal. 1969) (deciding that defendant motorist
was negligent as a matter of law and plaintiff pedestrian nonnegligent as a matter of law).
186
See Shoemake v. Wilsey, 277 P.2d 17, 19 (Cal. 1954) (upholding a verdict for defendant
motorist). See also Flores v. McCoy, 186 Cal. App. 2d 502 (1960) (holding that the jury was
entitled to find pedestrian contributorily negligent); Myers v. Carini, 262 Cal. App. 2d 614
(1968) (upholding the jury verdict despite questioning the instruction given to the jury);
Byrne v. County of San Francisco, 113 Cal. App. 3d 731 (1980) (holding that there was no
abuse of discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on sufficiency of evidence);
Cohen v. Bay Area Pie Co., 217 Cal. App. 2d 69 (1963) (holding jury was entitled to find that
the pedestrian had waived right-of-way in crosswalk); Mandakunian v. Zoller, No. B161836,
2004 WL 2712207 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2004) (upholding defense verdict for bus driver
who never saw pedestrian); Vitushkina v. Luminalt Energy Corp., No. A140393, 2014 WL
5803935 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2014) (upholding defense verdict and distinguishing a case
on which plaintiff relied); Webb v. Van Noort, 48 Cal. Rptr. 823 (Ct. App. 1966) (finding that,
under the statute, the jury was entitled to excuse motorist lacking knowledge that his turn
signal bulb was defective).
180
181
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liability as a matter of law for motorist crosswalk violations extend into
present times.187
VII. WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE US?
Cost-benefit analysis limits excessive requirements for durable
precaution, precaution plans, and heterogeneous nondurable precautions.
With respect to homogeneous nondurable precautions, like checking
blind spots and retrieving surgical sponges, the only control on jury
behavior is when the allegedly omitted nondurable precaution would
have been part of a precaution plan that was not cost-justified.
Nevertheless, it is surely uneconomic for the law to insist that people be
perfect in their use of homogeneous nondurable precaution. This seems
to be the primary justification for jury forgiveness of negligence, and jury
forgiveness is indeed most prominent in this area, though it is available
for other types of precaution as well. Whether the law creates too much
liability for lapses in nondurable precaution is a question that depends
partly on how frequently juries forgive.
It might be objected that a more appropriate remedy would be to
allow the parties to explore the defendant’s historical error rate. Courts
have largely rejected this option, as the following analysis demonstrates.
A. Inadmissibility of Prior Similar Incidents of Negligence
A seemingly logical way for courts to solve the problem of whether a
single error was negligent would be to allow plaintiffs to introduce
evidence about the defendant’s safety habits and reputation for safety,
especially prior identical errors. For instance, if a surgeon had a record of
leaving foreign objects in patients, then let the jury hear that evidence as
relevant to whether he or she was maintaining a reasonable and efficient
compliance rate. Surprisingly, the courts rarely allow this evidence to be
introduced on the issue of liability because they say it could be too
prejudicial.
Much of this doctrine can be explained by the hypothesis that courts
believe juries would be too likely to find liability based on a small and
possibly unlucky set of prior errors. Under this rule of evidence, a surgeon
who has forgotten two sponges or a pharmacist who has misdispensed
two prescriptions could be driven from his profession even though his
actual error rate might be above average. The courts’ logic appears to be

187
See Asmelash v. Braga, No. H023824, 2003 WL 21437634 (Cal. Ct. App. June 23, 2003)
(finding defendant motorist negligent as a matter of law in crosswalk violation case in which
no comparative negligence issue existed).
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that every surgeon188 or pharmacist189 must be exposed to suit for each
error but that it is undesirable that juries should be influenced by a record
of prior errors because such a record can be deceptive in a world in which
all surgeons and pharmacists err. In fact, this same rule applies to
nonprofessional errors, such as driving errors, 190 presumably for the same
reason. On the other hand, once a jury has found liability, it is proper to
allow evidence of the defendant’s prior similar errors on the issue of
Nevertheless, normally evidence supporting
punitive damages.191
punitive damages would be inadmissible unless there was also some
evidence that the defendant had acted with a conscious and deliberate
disregard of the interests of others. 192
The concern seems to be restricted to limiting damage to reputation
based on an unscientific sample. Where reputation is not involved, but
instead the plaintiff wants to introduce evidence that prior pedestrians
See Jackson v. Hajj, No. E030178, 2003 WL 21329772 (Cal. Ct. App. June 10, 2003)
(holding evidence of prior bungled surgery inadmissible against surgeon on issue of
negligence). Modern medical malpractice reform statutes sometimes prohibit a plaintiff
seeking to discover prior similar error by a health care professional, including a pharmacist,
which adds more force to the common-law rule in this arena. See Ex parte Rite Aid of Ala.,
Inc., 768 So. 2d 960, 963 (Ala. 2000) (holding that pharmacy was entitled to writ of mandamus
against discovery order seeking evidence of pharmacist’s prior dispensing errors similar to
dispensing error that killed plaintiff’s decedent).
189
See State ex rel. Malan v. Huesemann, 942 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (holding
that evidence of pharmacist’s prior errors was inadmissible against him to show that he
probably made the error in question or for just about any other reason).
190
See Grenadier v. Surface Transp. Corp. N.Y., 271 A.D. 460, 461 (N.Y. App. Div. 1946)
(holding driver’s previous accidents inadmissible). See also Hartley v. Szadkowski, 32
A.D.2d 550, 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (holding evidence about plaintiff’s prior auto accident
inadmissible in subsequent auto accident case); Robinson v. Albany, 218 N.Y.S.2d 421 (App.
Div. 1961) (holding that defendant police officer could not be asked about prior patrol car
accidents in case involving another accident in which plaintiff’s decedent was killed);
Downing v. Barrett Mobile Home Transp., 113 Cal. Rptr. 277 (Ct. App. 1974) (holding it was
reversible error to examine a party to an auto accident about prior accidents).
191
See Marjorie A. Shields, Exemplary or Punitive Damages for Pharmacist's Wrongful Conduct
in Preparing or Dispensing Medical Prescription—Cases Not under Consumer Product Safety Act
(15 U.S.C.A. § 2072), 109 A.L.R. 5th 397 (2003) (describing standards for establishing liability
against a pharmacist for compensatory and punitive damages for wrongful conduct in
preparing or filling a medical prescription). See also McClure v. Walgreen Co., 613 N.W.2d
225, 237 (Iowa 2000) (holding prior incidents of misfilled prescriptions relevant to punitive
damages); Harco Drugs v. Holloway, 669 So. 2d 878, 881 (Ala. 1995) (prior incidents of
misfilled prescriptions relevent to punitive damages).
192
See Gregory v. Wal-Mart Stores East L.P., No. CV 212-042, 2013 WL 3976648 (S.D. Ga.
Aug. 12, 2013) (holding that defendant, who misfilled prescription, was entitled to summary
judgment on the issue of punitive damages unless there was evidence it possessed “such a
conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct may be called
wilful or wanton” (quoting Comcast Corp. v. Warren, 650 S.E.2d 307, 311 (Ga. Ct. App.
2007))). See also Mableton Parkway CVS, Inc. v. Salter, 615 S.E.2d 558, 564 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding that punitive damages were unavailable for a simple dispensing error).
188
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had slipped on a particular cement divider, that evidence will be
received.193 Where a building had a prior fire, and there was independent
evidence of construction and maintenance problems, evidence of prior fire
was admissible relative to the issue of whether negligence had led to the
current fire.194 Consistently, the defendant in Crafter v. Metropolitan
Railway, discussed above, was allowed to introduce evidence that no
record existed of any other slip and fall on the steps in question since their
construction.195 When the defendant’s similar barrel of sulfuric acid
exploded on the same day as the barrel explosion that hurt the plaintiff,
the prior explosion was admissible to show the defendant’s negligence. 196
Nevertheless, when the proffered evidence goes more to the defendant’s
reputation for care than to a defined hazardous condition, the evidence is
excluded.197
B. A Stochastic Tax
The common-law system imposes a stochastic tax on negligent
behavior. Even obviously negligent behavior often earns jury forgiveness
and sometimes yields large damages. The very uncertainty of this system
encourages the settlement of claims. Very few plaintiffs can afford to roll
the wheel between one state of the world in which they receive a million
dollars and another state of the world in which they recover zero and even
have to pay the defendant some significant amount of his or her court

See Gilbert v. Pessin Grocery Co., 282 P.2d 148, 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (concluding that
prior trip and falls on cement divider in supermarket parking lot were admissible to show
foreseeability of hazard). See also Martin v. Our Lady of Wisdom Reg'l Sch., 54 N.Y.S.3d 692
(App. Div. 2017) (holding that prior accidents with defendant's gate were admissible to prove
defendant's negligence).
194
See Sivit v. Vill. Green of Beachwood, No. 98401, 2013 WL 177465 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan.
17, 2013) (holding that evidence of specific dangerous conditions at building and previously
litigated fires were both admissible). See also Kelly v. GEPA Hotel Owner Indianapolis LLC,
993 N.E.2d 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (stating that with allegations of negligent inspection and
maintenance, a juror could reasonably conclude that a more careful inspection of the elevator
on the two incidents prior to the plaintiff’s fall would have revealed a defeat in the motion
controller).
195
See Crafter v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. (1866) 1 LRCP 300, 301–04 (Eng.) (holding evidence
insufficient to show negligence).
196
See Gall v. Union Ice Co., 239 P.2d 48, 58–59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951) (finding that when
plaintiff was hurt by defendant’s exploding barrel of sulfuric acid, evidence that another of
defendant’s barrels exploded on the same day was admissible to show negligence).
197
See Johnson v. Target Corp., 487 F. App'x 298 (7th Cir. 2012) (trial court’s exclusion of
evidence of similar slip and falls at the same store was proper).
193
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costs.198 The system also encourages potential injurers to become insured,
either through market insurance or self-insurance.
The operation of the system is a far cry from the Euclidean conception
of the classical legal economists who have now thoroughly modeled the
conditions under which various liability rules will induce zero negligence.
The actual negligence system generates thousands, probably hundreds of
thousands, of negligent acts every day. Many of these are efficient in the
sense that they cannot be prevented at reasonable cost. Still, it is very
difficult for courts to assess whether they are efficient or not. The major
problem is that most efficient negligent acts look the same as their
inefficient counterparts. The ultimate issue is the rate of a person’s
negligent behavior, which cannot cheaply be measured. How well the
negligence system performs in producing safety at reasonable cost has
become an empirical question. The system is a decentralized system of
social control that in some settings seems to produce a significant amount
of safety. How else, with today’s technology, would we create so much
safety on public highways and elsewhere?
VIII. EXPLAINING DEFENDANTS’ APPELLATE ADVANTAGE
The empirical literature has uncovered a puzzle. On appeal,
defendants’ verdicts seem much more secure than plaintiffs’ verdicts, and
defendants’ verdicts after a bench trial seem much more secure than
defendants’ verdicts after a jury trial. 199 These findings extend across a
See, e.g., Minnegren v. Nozar, 4 Cal. App. 5th 500 (2016) (ordering plaintiff to pay
defendant’s court costs in a case in which defendant failed to yield right-of-way and t-boned
plaintiff).
199
See Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts Redux—An
Empirical Study of State Court Trials on Appeal, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 100, 114 (2015)
[hereinafter Eisenberg & Heise Redux]. Other reports of different levels of defendants’
appellate advantage for different types of cases are contained in Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: Defendants’ Advantage, 3 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 125, 137 tbl.2 (2001) (reporting different levels of defendants’ appellate advantage in
different types of federal cases from 1988–97); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments,
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 954 tbl.2 (2002) (reporting appellate reversal rates in different types
of federal cases from 1988–97); Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State
Courts—An Empirical Study of State Court Trials on Appeal, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 127–28, 134
tbl.2 (2009) (reporting different levels of defendants’ appellate advantage in different types
of state cases, 2001–05); Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, Why Do Plaintiffs Lose
Appeals? Biased Trial Courts, Litigious Losers, or Low Trial Win Rates?, 15 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
73, 76, 99 tbl.7 (2013) (reporting different levels of defendants’ appellate advantage in
different types of federal cases from 1988–98) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Farber]; Michael
Heise & Martin T. Wells, Revisiting Eisenberg and Plaintiff Success: State Court Civil Trial and
Appellate Outcomes, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 516, 516, 524 tbl.2 (2016) (reporting different
levels of defendants’ appellate advantage in different types of state cases from 2001–09).
198
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variety of cases, including negligence cases. Among negligence “motor
vehicle” cases tried in state courts between 2005 and 2009, defendants won
31.0% of their appeals, and plaintiffs won only 12.5% of their own. 200
During the same period, defendants won 32.1% of medical malpractice
appeals, while plaintiffs in these cases won 24.2% of their appeals. 201
Empirical scholars have mainly argued that trial courts and their juries
favor plaintiffs because they empathize with victims; then, to restore
balance, appellate courts disfavor plaintiffs.202 Because appellate courts
perceive that juries favor plaintiffs more than trial judges do, appellate
courts’ favor of defendants is more pronounced when they review jurytried, as opposed to bench-tried, cases.203 Another theory is that plaintiffs
often bring weak cases to trial, and these weak cases are then recognized
as bad cases by appellate courts possibly, again, because trial courts are
biased in favor of plaintiffs.204
If we think first of negligence law, we can better explain negligence
defendants’ appellate advantage with negligence law’s inherent
asymmetry in which, at all levels, judgments as a matter of law are much
more common for defendants than for plaintiffs. 205 A basic purpose of
judgment as a matter of law for plaintiffs is to prevent jury forgiveness of
violations of recognized legal standards, and a corresponding purpose of
judgments as a matter of law for defendants is to prevent juries from
implementing their own excessive standards that go beyond the
recognized legal standard. When a body of law like negligence allows
many more judgments as a matter of law for defendants than for plaintiffs,
it suggests that courts are more concerned about juries implementing an
excessive legal standard than they are concerned about jury forgiveness.
See Eisenberg & Heise Redux, supra note 199, at 114 tbl.2.
See id. The apparent defendants’ advantage in medical malpractice cases possessed a
lower statistical significance as compared to motor vehicle cases because of a smaller number
of cases in the sample.
202
See Eisenberg & Farber, supra note 199, at 106 (providing several related theories for
defendants’ appellate advantage).
203
See Eisenberg & Heise Redux, supra note 199, at 105–06.
204
See id. at 105–08.
205
Further evidence for this asymmetry is that in federal court tort cases, defendants filed
85% of the motions for summary judgment, and plaintiffs filed only 14% of these motions.
See Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Judge Michael Baylson
6 tbl.1 (Aug. 13, 2008), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/sujulrs2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RQU3-SN3N] [hereinafter Cecil & Cort Memorandum]. This statistic
from federal courts probably understates the asymmetry in state courts because many of the
tort cases tried in federal courts are FTCA cases, always tried to judges, which facilitates
judgment as a matter of law for plaintiffs. Indeed, no other judgment is possible. See also
Jonah B. Gelbach, Rethinking Summary Judgment Empirics: The Life of the Parties, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 1663, 1669 (2014) (finding that the “vast majority” of federal tort summary judgment
motions are filed by defendants).
200
201
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The desire of appellate courts to protect jury forgiveness could explain
why negligence defendants’ jury verdicts seem so secure on appeal,
especially in areas in which jury forgiveness is prominent, such as
negligence law.206
Think again of Minnegren v. Nozar,207 which was discussed above.208
In that case several witnesses testified that to get to an open parking space,
the defendant ran a stop sign and then heedlessly accelerated through an
intersection and struck the plaintiff. We know that the defendant offered
over $20,000 to settle this case, but the plaintiff rejected it and went to trial
where the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. Why the jury forgave
the defendant we do not know. Perhaps the jurors inferred that the
defendant had probably made a settlement offer, and they were angered
that they had to take time to decide the case. 209 Or they could have just
liked the defendant better than the plaintiff. In either event, once the jury
found for the defendant, the verdict was fortified by the appellate court’s
procedural rules. This means the facts of the case became the defendant’s
version of the facts so long as they were supported by “substantial
evidence,” which in extreme cases like Minnegren can mean merely the
evidence of a single self-serving witness, even when opposed by multiple
independent witnesses. Because the defendant had testified that he did
stop at the stop sign and that he looked for opposing traffic, those became
the legally germane facts on appeal. If the plaintiff had won the jury
verdict, the legally germane facts on appeal would have been the opposite.
Thus, these fact-interpretative rules have an equal tendency to lock in both
defendants’ and plaintiffs’ verdicts and do not, by themselves, solve the
puzzle.
As suggested above, the root cause of defendants’ appellate
advantage may be that defendants possess many more arguments than
plaintiffs for judgment as a matter of law. Most importantly, if a court
thought that a plaintiff’s alleged and proven untaken precaution against
the defendant was not required by cost-benefit analysis, the court will
As noted at the beginning of Part VIII, among negligence “motor vehicle” cases tried in
state courts between 2005 and 2009, defendants won 31.0% of their appeals, and plaintiffs
won only 12.5% of their own. See supra text accompanying note 200. During the same period,
defendants won 32.1% of medical malpractice appeals, while plaintiffs in these cases won
24.2% of their appeals. See supra text accompanying note 201. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Heise
Redux, supra note 199, at 114 tbl.2 (providing statistics on motor vehicle and medical
malpractice cases). Defendants’ lesser appellate advantage in medical malpractice cases may
suggest that courts are more concerned with jury forgiveness of medical negligence than
with jury forgiveness of motorist negligence possibly because juries are more disposed to
forgive medical negligence, perhaps excessively in the appellate courts’ view.
207
Minnegren v. Nozar, 208 Cal. Rptr. 3d 655 (Ct. App. 2016).
208
See supra text accompanying notes 171–77.
209
The jury of course would not have been told about the plaintiff’s settlement offered.
206
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reverse a plaintiff’s verdict. In medical and professional malpractice cases,
a court will reverse a jury’s verdict because of an absence or paucity of
expert evidence showing that the untaken precaution proven by the
plaintiff was required by the ruling professional standards. Plaintiffs who
have lost verdicts possess no equivalent appellate arrows to aim at their
victorious opponents. It seems that many bodies of substantive law create
larger opportunity sets for no liability as a matter of law 210 than for its
opposite. With these bodies of law, like negligence, the imbalance in
appellate success suggests that courts are more concerned with preventing
the implementation of excessive jury conceptions of the legal standard
than they are about jury forgiveness of violations of the legal standard.
This theory also suggests a prediction that can be empirically assessed.
Defendants’ appellate advantage should be least pronounced for bodies
of substantive law in which judgments as a matter of law for plaintiffs are
about as frequent as those for defendants.211
The ratios of plaintiff-to-defendant appellate wins famously fail to
conform to the 50-50 ratio theorized by Priest and Klein.212 Nevertheless,
Priest and Klein expressly limited their theory and empirical evidence to
trials.213 Because appeals result only from tried cases,214 and not from the
much larger set of potential legal claims, these appeals are not intensively
“selected” from a large pool as tried cases are. Under the Priest-Klein
theory, the proportion of won and lost appeals should better reflect the
overall proportion of wins and losses in the general population of similar
appeals. Although defendants generally win more appeals than plaintiffs,
See Joe S. Cecil, Rebecca N. Eyre, Dean Miletich & David Rindskopf, A Quarter-Century
of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861,
886–89 (2007) (defendants make nearly three times more motions for summary judgment,
and succeed on them more often, than plaintiffs); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell,
Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821 (2010) (criticizing trends toward
judgment as matter of law for defendants following the ruling in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662 (2009)).
211
See infra text accompanying notes 212–22 (providing more predictors of defendants’
appellate advantage within specific areas of law).
212
See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Priest & Klein] (first theorizing that trial results should be
distributed approximately 50% for plaintiffs and 50% for defendants); Donald Wittman, Is
the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 185 (1985) (criticizing the Priest-Klein
theory and offering a somewhat different theory); George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection
Hypothesis: Learning from Wittman’s Mistakes, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 215 (1985) (defending the
Priest-Klein theory).
213
Priest and Klein repeatedly refer to “trials” and “verdicts,” and all their empirical
evidence in support of their 50% theory relates to trial results. See Priest & Klein, supra note
212, at 30–51.
214
Under Priest-Klein and other studies following it, a trial can include a sustained motion
for summary judgment or a sustained demurrer or motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.
210
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the degree of the appellate advantage possessed by defendants varies
significantly across different bodies of law.215
Plaintiffs’ judgments as a matter of law in copyright infringement cases
are probably a much higher proportion relative to defendants’ judgments
as a matter of law when compared to the proportion between the two in
negligence cases.216 For instance, when a defendant makes a slavish or
mechanical copy of a plaintiff’s copyrighted work, the plaintiff can win
partial summary judgment on the issue of liability without the need to
send this part of the case to a jury. 217 Such copyright cases appear to be
relatively common.218 That the possibilities for judgment as a matter of
law are equally balanced may be symptomatic of a body of law in which
jury forgiveness of defendants is not a large factor, either because jury
forgiveness would not promote the courts’ objectives (so that courts
prevent it) or because juries are not disposed to forgive violations of the
body of law in question. In addition, unlike with negligence cases, juries
in copyright cases may not be disposed to implement an excessive legal
standard, which would be another factor that would bring copyright
judgments as a matter law for defendants more into balance with similar
judgments for plaintiffs. Consistently, and in contrast to negligence

See Eisenberg & Heise Redux, supra note 199, at 114 tbl.2. Defendants possess extreme
appellate advantages in state court actions involving “assault, slander, libel”; “products
liability”; and “employment contract.” Id. In all of these substantive areas, it is plausible
that courts would be more concerned about the implementation of excessive liability
standards than with jury forgiveness.
216
I have been unable to find what, if any, is defendants’ appellate advantage in copyright
cases. To my knowledge, the only area in which plaintiffs possess an appellate advantage is
with federal “negotiable instruments” cases. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments,
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 954 tbl.2 (2002). Because I know less about that body of law than
copyright, I am using copyright as my example. The empirical literature does record a low
defendants’ appellate advantage in “intellectual property” cases.
217
See, e.g., Sanrio, Inc. v. Ronnie Home Textile, Inc., No. CV 14-06369-RSWL-JEMx, 2016
WL 5956096, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2016) (holding that summary judgment in favor of
plaintiff is proper, inter alia, where the “works are so overwhelmingly identical that the
possibility of independent creation is precluded”); Alan J. Hartnick, Summary Judgment in
Copyright: From Cole Porter to Superman, 3 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 53 (1984).
218
The search “adv: copyright & ‘summary judgment #in favor #of plaintiff’” in the
Westlaw All Federal library returned 339 cases on March 29, 2019. On the same date, the
search “adv: negligence & ‘summary judgment #in favor #of plaintiff’” in the Westlaw All
States library yielded 1042 cases. The All States population of negligence cases must be much
more than three times greater than the All Federal population of copyright cases, suggesting
that judgment as a matter of law for plaintiffs is less common in negligence than in copyright
cases. When I searched the respective Westlaw libraries for “copyright” and “negligence,”
to attempt to find the respective populations, the system returned 10,000 cases for each, the
system default limit, which is uninformative.
215
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appeals, intellectual property defendants possess practically no advantage
on appeal.219
A legal area’s ratio of judgments as a matter of law for defendants 220
to those for plaintiffs will not be the complete cause of defendants’
appellate advantage, but this causative factor should correlate well with
other causes, such as the extent to which defendants are entitled to jury
instructions encouraging juries to forgive defendants’ violations of legal
standards and the like. In a rational system, the causes of defendants’
appellate advantage should reflect courts’ concerns in different
substantive areas about the cost of further (i.e., marginal) jury absolutions
of violations together with the cost of marginal implementations by juries
of excessive legal standards. Defendants’ appellate success will be more
related to the former and plaintiff’s appellate success more related to the
latter. Theoretically, however, either factor or both could influence either
party’s appellate success. An appellate court could find for a defendant
I have been unable to find the appellate win rates for copyright cases taken by
themselves. As for “intellectual property” appeals, see Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and
Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes,
1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 672 (2004) (reporting that in intellectual property cases from
1987–95, plaintiffs won 32.8% of their appeals and defendants won 36.7% of theirs, which is
a much smaller disparity than for negligence and most other types of cases). It is possible
that defendants’ appellate advantage in copyright cases is even smaller than in the larger
category of intellectual property cases. See also John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L.
Schwartz, Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769 (2014)
(depicting statistical analysis conducted on summary judgment rulings in patent litigation
like, for example, patentees win a significant number of summary judgment motions in
district courts on the issue of patent invalidity for most patents).
The most prominent comparison of cases in the literature is between employment
discrimination cases for which defendants possess a large appellate advantage and
negotiable instrument cases for which plaintiffs possess a modest appellate advantage. See
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights
Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947 (2002). This result
suggests that defendants in employment discrimination cases receive judgment as a matter
of law much more commonly than do the plaintiffs in these cases but that in negotiable
instrument cases, judgment as a matter of law is much more balanced between plaintiffs and
defendants and even that plaintiffs get judgment as a matter of law more often than
defendants, the opposite of the situation in negligence law and probably most other bodies
of law. See also Vivian Berger, Michael O. Finkelstein & Kenneth Cheung, Summary Judgment
Benchmarks for Settling Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45
(2005) (reporting that a large proportion of employment discrimination cases settle because
either summary judgment is granted for the defendant or the defendant has threatened to
motion for summary judgment).
220
A judgment as a matter of law for one party or the other can be ordered by an appellate
court as well as a trial court. If, in a negligence case, an appellate court finds that all the
defendant’s untaken precautions, as alleged by the plaintiff, exceeded the requirements of
cost-benefit analysis, the court will often order judgment as a matter of law for the defendant,
as by reversing a trial court’s refusal to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the
defendant after a plaintiff’s verdict.
219
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because it thought that juries in that area of law had adopted appropriate
levels of forgiveness (and so this jury should be permitted to forgive) or
because it thought that this jury had implemented an excessive legal
standard. As noted at the beginning of the discussion, with almost the
same level of appellate reversals in favor of defendants (31.0% and 32.1%,
respectively), plaintiffs possess only a 12.5% reversal rate in motor vehicle
negligence cases but a 24.2% reversal rate in medical malpractice cases.
Appellate courts may be assessing that the current rate of jury forgiveness
of defendants in motor vehicle negligence cases is appropriate with
deterrence goals in mind but that jury forgiveness in medical malpractice
cases is excessive in terms of what patients lose through diminished
deterrence of medical errors.
This conception of the problem assumes that some positive benefit
comes from jury decision-making because both excessive jury forgiveness
and excessive jury standards impose unique costs vis à vis bench trials.
Positive levels of jury forgiveness and excessive standards are probably
beneficial in some areas of law for their own unique reasons and because
both “errors” promote settlement by increasing the economic risk of trial,
that is, the variance of different trial results upon the same or similar
facts.221
With intellectual property, the contractual economy depends on
certainty.
Any uncertainty, which would certainly result from
widespread jury forgiveness of copyright infringement, would operate as
a tax upon the benefits of copyright law. Thus, courts may award
judgment as a matter of law for plaintiffs in large numbers of copyright
cases to prevent jury forgiveness of defendants. With negligence, by
contrast, contractual certainty is not as important, largely because
insurers—the main contractual players—can rely on the predictability of
the large numbers of potential negligent auto accidents in their insurance
books, whether juries forgive or not. 222 In addition, full liability for all
inadvertent
negligence—the
most
common
type—could
counterproductively incentivize overprecaution because inadvertent
221
See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for
Care and Litigation, 22 RAND J. ECON. 562 (1991) (noting that uncertainty in law can lead to
positive legal results that both compensate the plaintiff and deter the defendant); Tom Baker,
Alon Harel & Tamar Kugler, The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89
IOWA L. REV. 443 (2004) (analyzing how uncertainty in law can lead to positive legal results
in both criminal and tort law). But see J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational
Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263 (1989) (finding
that Japanese courts produce so much certainty in auto accident cases that it promotes
settlement).
222
See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521,
1540–43 (1987) (explaining why the law of large numbers often makes insured risks
predictable to insurance companies).
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negligence is sometimes efficient, notably in the auto-accident arena.
Copyright infringement, by contrast, is more often intentional and more
likely to be inefficient on its face. Thus, jury forgiveness of copyright
infringement would be counterproductive from that perspective as well.
Therefore, when the statistic is finally revealed, I predict a smaller
appellate advantage for defendants in copyright cases than in motor
vehicle negligence cases.
IX. CONCLUSION
The classical economic theory of negligence was basically a translation
of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s theory of negligence. It even extended it.
Nevertheless, theories can blind us to reality as much as they can help us
see it more clearly. It is a remarkable tribute to Holmes’s analytical and
rhetorical skills how influential his theory still remains even though legal
practice falsifies it with practically every new negligence case.
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